Blind Spots II — Motivated Blindness

Although we have more trouble seeing our own unethical behavior than we do seeing others' unethical behavior, Max H. Bazerman and Ann E. Tenbrunsel, the authors of the new book Blind Spots: Why We Fail to Do What's Right and What to Do about It, have found that people have a tendency "to overlook the unethical behavior of others when it is not in their best interest to notice the infraction." They call this "motivated blindness."

The principal example the authors give for motivated blindness is auditors who show a strong bias toward the interests of their clients. "Rather than making a conscious decision to favor their clients, the participants assimilated information about the target company in a biased way. … Auditors became more like their clients than they would be if no such motivation existed; as a result, they are unlikely to see the unethical actions and biases in their clients' behavior." Other elements in creating motivated blindness include fear, incentives, organizational loyalty, and organizational culture.

In the context of local government ethics, motivated blindness can best be seen when local government attorneys are advising their "clients," that is, officials, especially top officials and local legislators, on ethics matters. Too often, they give officials the advice that is in their personal interest (that is, what will not hurt their personal reputation) rather than the advice that is in the public interest.

It is generally assumed that this bias is intentional. But I agree with the authors that often it is not conscious at all. This is why it is so important to constantly remind local government attorneys, both staff and outside counsel, that they are not representing the people they consult with, but rather the city, county, or agency, that is, the public. The people they consult with just happen to be sitting in their positions. When it comes to possible conflicts between such officials' personal interest and the public interest, it is important that local government attorneys consciously recognize that their client is not quite the same as the client they help with writing an ordinance or handling a suit against the local government.

In many situations, local government attorneys need to recognize that, considering the personal, business, and political relationship they have with officials, they should not be giving officials ethics advice at all, because they themselves are conflicted, even if neither the local ethics code nor the rules of professional conduct prohibit the attorney from providing the advice.

The authors say that our "audit system makes it psychologically impossible, because of motivated blindness, for even the most honest auditors to make objective judgments; cases of audit failure are inevitable." Unbiased audits are unlikely as long as auditors are hired and fired by the companies they audit. This is equally true of local government attorneys, and even ethics officers and ethics commission staff who are selected by local government officials.

This is one reason why those who give or prepare ethics advice should be appointed by and report only to an ethics commission. This removes the organizational loyalty, incentives, pressures, and fears that lead people within a local government to be blinded by their relationships with officials.

Robert Wechsler
Director of Research-Retired, City Ethics

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