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Local Public Financing Programs Make Elections More Local
Wednesday, September 4th, 2013
Robert Wechsler
When people write about public campaign financing programs, they
tend to focus on participation percentages and the size of the
campaign contributions. But what is most interesting about the
analysis done by the New Haven Independent of campaign
contributions given to mayoral candidates participating and not
participating in the city's public financing program, the New Haven
Democracy Fund, is the difference with respect to contributions from
New Haven residents and from elsewhere.
This analysis was done after the July 1 campaign finance report filing deadline. An article following the September 1 filing, without the graphs, went up on the Independent's website yesterday.
This is the first competitive Democratic primary since the Democracy Fund program began in 2007 (I was the Fund's administrator from 2007 to 2012). Three candidates participated in the Fund, and two did not. The Fund double matches the first $25 of each New Haven resident's aggregate campaign contribution to a candidate. This means that when a New Haven resident makes a $25 contribution, the candidate gets $75 (assuming the candidate qualifies for the program, as all three participating candidates did).
In the period ended July 1, the percentage of New Haven contributions to the participating candidates was, respectively (in order of the total amount of contributions to each candidate), 79%, 95%, 93%. The percentages for the non-participating candidates was 28% and 29%.
This does not just reflect percentages. The leading participating candidate received 865 local contributions as opposed to 140 and 98 by the two non-participating candidate. In fact, the participating candidate had more contributions than the leading non-participating candidate in her own zip code.
In the July-August period, the leading participating candidate received another 302 contributions from locals (83% of his total), while the non-participating candidates received, respectively, another 287 (41%) and 66 (25%).
What this means is that a public financing program that matches only the contributions of local residents makes an election much more local, at least to the extent candidates participate. Local residents are encouraged to get involved by making small contributions that matter, and big contributors from out of town, often contractors, developers, and others who seek special benefits from the winning candidate, can't give enough to matter, because the amount they can contribute is limited (37% of what they can contribute to a non-participating candidate).
It's too bad that two of the three most likely candidates to win chose not to participate in the Democracy Fund. If one of the two non-participating candidates does win, it will be seen as thanks to out-of-towners, contractors, unions, and PACs. This, plus the size of the contributions from these non-residents, would likely undermine the new mayor's legitimacy.
Robert Wechsler
Director of Research-Retired, City Ethics
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This analysis was done after the July 1 campaign finance report filing deadline. An article following the September 1 filing, without the graphs, went up on the Independent's website yesterday.
This is the first competitive Democratic primary since the Democracy Fund program began in 2007 (I was the Fund's administrator from 2007 to 2012). Three candidates participated in the Fund, and two did not. The Fund double matches the first $25 of each New Haven resident's aggregate campaign contribution to a candidate. This means that when a New Haven resident makes a $25 contribution, the candidate gets $75 (assuming the candidate qualifies for the program, as all three participating candidates did).
In the period ended July 1, the percentage of New Haven contributions to the participating candidates was, respectively (in order of the total amount of contributions to each candidate), 79%, 95%, 93%. The percentages for the non-participating candidates was 28% and 29%.
This does not just reflect percentages. The leading participating candidate received 865 local contributions as opposed to 140 and 98 by the two non-participating candidate. In fact, the participating candidate had more contributions than the leading non-participating candidate in her own zip code.
In the July-August period, the leading participating candidate received another 302 contributions from locals (83% of his total), while the non-participating candidates received, respectively, another 287 (41%) and 66 (25%).
What this means is that a public financing program that matches only the contributions of local residents makes an election much more local, at least to the extent candidates participate. Local residents are encouraged to get involved by making small contributions that matter, and big contributors from out of town, often contractors, developers, and others who seek special benefits from the winning candidate, can't give enough to matter, because the amount they can contribute is limited (37% of what they can contribute to a non-participating candidate).
It's too bad that two of the three most likely candidates to win chose not to participate in the Democracy Fund. If one of the two non-participating candidates does win, it will be seen as thanks to out-of-towners, contractors, unions, and PACs. This, plus the size of the contributions from these non-residents, would likely undermine the new mayor's legitimacy.
Robert Wechsler
Director of Research-Retired, City Ethics
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