Full Text of Model Ethics Code

  • Part A: Ethics Provisions
  • Part B: Administrative Provisions
    • 201. Duties of City Clerk.
    • 202 Maintenance of Disclosure Statements.
    • 203 Ethics Commission: Establishment; Qualifications of Members; Appointment of Members; Term of Office.
    • 204. Ethics Commission: Vacancies.
    • 205. Ethics Commission: Removal of Members.
    • 206. Ethics Commission: Meetings.
    • 207. Ethics Commission: Jurisdiction, Powers, and Duties.
    • 208. Lists, Complaint Forms, and Disclosure Statements.
    • 209. Advisory Opinions.
    • 210. Waivers.
    • 211. Training and Education.
    • 212 Annual Reports; Review of Ethics Laws.
    • 213. Filing a Complaint; Investigations.
    • 214. Public Hearing Process.
    • 215. Finding of Violation; Penalties; Injunctive Relief.
    • 216. Judicial Review.
    • 217. Public Inspection of Records; Public Access to Meetings.
    • 218. Miscellaneous Provisions.
    • 219. Distribution and Posting.
    • 220 Liberal Construction of Code.
    • 221 Severability.
    • 222. Effective Date.
    • APPENDIX A: Annual Disclosure Statement
    • To read the foreword and introduction to this Model Code, click here.
      To discuss the Model Ethics Code Project itself, click here.
      To discuss municipal ethics codes in general - their value, necessity, and role in ethics programs - click here.
      To discuss problems and solution with respect to getting ethics codes passed or improved, click here.

      Model Municipal Code of Ethics

      Declaration of Policy, Purpose, and Obligations

      To discuss declarations of policy, click here.

      The proper operation of our city's government requires that public officials and employees act as public servants: courteous, impartial, honest, open, and responsible to the city's residents; that they act as fiduciaries entrusted with and responsible for the property and resources of the community; that they make governmental decisions and policies in the proper channels of the government structure, free of coercive or other improper influence; and that they use their office and employment in the best interests of the city rather than for personal interests, whether their own interests or those of their family, friends, or business and political associates.

      It is central to gaining and retaining the public's trust in our city's government that public servants seek to avoid even the appearance of impropriety. Fulfilling one's role as public servant sometimes means sacrificing rather than gaining opportunities.

      This code focuses on conflicts of interest, which affect the decisions of government officials and employees in ways that are unfair both to the community and to individuals and entities who lack special relationships with our city's officials. When public servants make decisions that are not or do not appear to be impartial, this seriously undermines public confidence in government.

      While the vast majority of municipal officials are well-meaning, being well-meaning is not enough. It is important that officials understand the conflicts they confront every day, appreciate their fiduciary obligations to city residents, and recognize the importance of preventing conflicts from occurring, disclosing conflicts when they arise, and withdrawing from any involvement in a matter where they have a conflict (recusing themselves).

      Nothing is more important to public trust than having public servants err on the side of disclosing every possible conflict and recusing themselves even where they feel certain they can act impartially.

      The purposes of this ethics code are:

      (a) To establish standards of ethical conduct - especially those dealing with conflicts between personal interests and those of the city - for city officials, employees, consultants, candidates, and those who do business with the city;

      (b) To provide clear guidance with respect to such standards by clarifying which acts are allowed and which are not;

      (c) To promote public confidence in the integrity of our city's governance and administration;

      (d) To provide for the consideration of potential ethical problems before they arise, to minimize unwarranted suspicion and to enhance the accountability of our city's government to city residents; and

      (e) To provide for the fair and effective administration and enforcement of this code.

      There is more to ethical conduct than what is covered by this code, which consists primarily of enforceable rules about conflicts of interest. The city must also provide a healthy ethical environment with positive means of encouraging ethical behavior among its public servants. And individuals - especially community leaders - must commit themselves to thinking and acting ethically.

      Ethical conduct depends on thinking about one's acts not in terms of what is politically popular, best for oneself and one's colleagues, or even most effective and efficient, but in terms of what is in the best interests of the city. Ethics is not just about enforceable rules, but also about democratic ideals and aspirational goals. Central to ethical action is respect for city residents (treating them as ends rather than as means) as well as self-respect (integrity, expecting the best of oneself).

      There are expectations placed on those who govern and administer our city's government, there are values to which our city's officials and employees aspire, and there are obligations that our city's officials and employees accept when they take their jobs or offices. This is especially true of elected officials and department heads, because they have accepted more responsibility for the decisions that are made.

      The American Society for Public Administration's (ASPA) Code of Ethics is an excellent list of a government administrator's obligations, based on values rather than job description. These are the obligations our government leaders should be reinforcing and to which individuals should be committing themselves. The ASPA Code is especially valuable because it is not the work of ethics specialists, but of government administrators themselves. These obligations will not be enforced by the Ethics Commission, because they are difficult to define concretely enough so that they can be enforced.* However, these values and obligations should be expected and aspired to in our city. Anyone who has questions about these values and obligations may seek clarification from the Ethics Commission as to how they apply them to specific situations.

      * Note that the ASPA code is intended for unelected administrators, so that the provision requiring nonpartisanship should not be applied to elected officials who belong to political parties. On the other hand, the most basic conflict of interest in government (accepted as it is by our democratic process) is between the public interest and the interest of elected officials in getting re-elected.

      American Society for Public Administration
      Code of Ethics

      To discuss aspirational ethics codes, click here.


      I. Serve the Public Interest

      • Exercise discretionary authority to promote the public interest.
      • Oppose all forms of discrimination and harassment, and promote affirmative action.
      • Recognize and support the public's right to know the public's business.
      • Involve citizens in policy decision-making.
      • Exercise compassion, benevolence, fairness, and optimism.
      • Respond to the public in ways that are complete, clear, and easy to understand.
      • Assist citizens in their dealings with government.
      • Be prepared to make decisions that may not be popular.

      II. Respect the Constitution and the Law

      • Understand and apply legislation and regulations relevant to their professional role.
      • Work to improve and change laws and policies that are counterproductive or obsolete.
      • Eliminate unlawful discrimination.
      • Prevent all forms of mismanagement of public funds by establishing and maintaining strong fiscal and management controls, and by supporting audits and investigative activities.
      • Respect and protect privileged information.
      • Encourage and facilitate legitimate dissent activities in government and protect the whistle-blowing rights of public employees.
      • Promote constitutional principles of equality, fairness, representativeness, responsiveness, and due process in protecting citizens' rights.

      III. Demonstrate Personal Integrity

      • Maintain truthfulness and honesty and not compromise them for advancement, honor, or personal gain.
      • Ensure that others receive credit for their work and contributions.
      • Zealously guard against conflict of interest or its appearance: e.g., nepotism, improper outside employment, misuse of public resources, or the acceptance of gifts.
      • Respect superiors, subordinates, colleagues, and the public.
      • Take responsibility for their own errors.
      • Conduct official acts without partisanship.

      IV. Promote Ethical Organizations

      • Enhance organizational capacity for open communication, creativity, and dedication.
      • Establish procedures that promote ethical behavior and hold individuals and organizations accountable for their conduct.
      • Provide organization members with an administrative means for dissent, assurance of due process, and safeguards against reprisal.
      • Promote merit principles that protect against arbitrary and capricious actions.
      • Promote organizational accountability through appropriate controls and procedures.
      • Encourage organizations to adopt, distribute, and periodically review the code of ethics as a living document.

      V. Strive for Professional Excellence

      • Provide support and encouragement to upgrade competence.
      • Accept as a personal duty the responsibility to keep up to date on emerging issues and potential problems.
      • Encourage others, throughout their careers, to participate in professional activities and associations. Allocate time to meet with students and provide a bridge between classroom studies and the realities of public service.

      This code is enacted pursuant to [Section ____] of [state statutes] and is not intended to authorize any conduct prohibited by that section.

      Comment: It is helpful to list other municipal and state ethics-related laws here, or reference a supplement containing them, so that all ethics laws are available in one place. In this way, people will not have to search for them or worry if they have missed any rules or exceptions. It is also helpful for authors of ethics laws to consult all other relevant laws, so that there will not be any contradictions.

      Here are the citations in the Connecticut model code I wrote, including only references to state law: "The power to adopt an ethics code is provided in 7-148(c)(10)(b). There are some specific conflict of interest rules in 7-148t. Allegations, confidentiality, and probable cause findings are provided for in 1-82a. A business with which an official or employee is associated is defined in 1-79(b). And the Freedom of Information Act can be found in Chapter 14, 1-200 to 1-242."

      Why freedom of information? Because it involves one of the most often abused conflicts of interest: between the public's right to know and the municipal official's desire to keep information hidden, for personal or political reasons (it's much easier to do one's job in secret than in the public eye; it is especially easier to act unethically when acting in secret). In fact, it would be completely appropriate for a municipal ethics code to supplement the Freedom of Information Act in areas that have been problems in a particular city. For example, an ethics code could include longer notice requirements for meetings and agendas, shorter periods in which to provide information (as well as lower reproduction costs), and requirements for notice and the placement of information on the city website.

      Part A: Ethics Provisions

      100. General Conflict of Interest Provisions.

      1. Conflict of Interest.

      To discuss this provision, click here.

      An official or employee* may not use his or her official position or office, or take or fail to take any action, or influence others to take or fail to take any action, in a manner which he or she knows, or has reason to believe, may result in a personal* or financial benefit*, not shared with a substantial segment of the city's population, for any of the following persons or entities:

      1. himself or herself;
      2. a member of his or her household*, including a domestic partner* and his or her dependents, or the employer or business of any of these people;
      3. a sibling or step-sibling, step-child, parent or step-parent, niece or nephew, uncle or aunt, or grandparent or grandchild of either himself or herself, or of his or her spouse or domestic partner, or the employer or business of any of these people;
      4. an outside employer or business* of his or hers, or of his or her spouse or domestic partner, or someone who works for such outside employer or business;
      5. a customer or client*;
      6. a person or entity from whom the official or employee* has received an election campaign contribution of more than $200 in the aggregate during the past election cycle (this amount includes contributions from a person's immediate family or business as well as contributions from an entity's owners, directors, or officers, as well as contributions to the official or employee*'s party town committee or non-candidate political committee);
      7. a substantial debtor or creditor of his or hers, or of his or her spouse or domestic partner; or

      8. a nongovernmental civic group, union, social, charitable, or religious organization of which he or she (or his or her spouse or domestic partner) is an officer or director.

      Comment: The central point of an ethics code is that city officials and employees should not prefer, over the public interest, their own interests or the interests of their family or business associates. There are other relationships that should be included in the above list, but cannot due to problems of defining them. These include romantic relationships short of domestic partnership, and close friends and associates.

      The general rule is: If it looks to others as if you might be giving someone special treatment, or if it would look that way to others if they knew about the relationship, then you should not act with respect to that person or entity, and instead recuse yourself under subsection 3 below. It is important to give city residents confidence that their officials and employees are treating everyone the same, even when you believe that you can be totally impartial.

      The most common way to define conflict of interest is as follows: No person subject to this code shall have any interest, financial or otherwise, direct or indirect, or engage in any business, employment, transaction or professional activity, or incur any obligation of any nature, which is in substantial conflict with the proper discharge of his or her public duties or employment. However, most government officials and employees do, on occasion, have conflicting interests. The important thing is not for them to prevent them, but rather to manage them honestly and responsibly, that is, to disclose them and to not act where there is such a conflict, no matter how impartial they feel they can be. What matters is not whether one can still act with integrity, but whether one will be perceived that way. It should be noted that even voting or making a decision against a friend or relative, in order not to seem partial, is not acting impartially, because the reason for the vote or decision is wrong: it might actually be better or more fair to vote or decide in favor of the friend.

      The one thing the common approach contains which does not appear in this model code is a prohibition of outside employment where there is not a conflict with a particular government interest, but instead with the general government interest in "the proper discharge of an employee or official's duties" (a term that, by the way, is too vague to allow for enforcement). Outside employment does not only lead to conflicts of interest as defined in this code, but also interferes with doing one's job by affecting the official or employee's time, energy, and focus. Volunteers are expected to have other jobs, and it is not fair to prevent low-paid employees from having evening, weekend, or holiday jobs, but many cities have rules limiting the amount and type of outside employment. Please contribute outside employment provisions which you feel are just (or unjust), enforceable or unenforceable, and explain why. Such provisions should include procedural requirements, for example, applying for formal, written permission from one's supervisor or department head (including disclosure of any officials, employees, or contractors involved), and the written acceptance of limitations on time and place of outside employment.

      There is also nothing in this model code about incompatible positions in government and parties, that is, holding legislative and administrative positions, for example, especially where one office has the power to remove or affect the other's budget; or multiple administrative positions that stretch an official or employee too thin; or non-governmental positions that can have a great effect on government, for example, a department head who is an officer of a local political party, posing a question about his or her responsibility to all citizens vs. to party members, as well as putting him in a position of affecting who his boss will be, come the next election. Often such rules do not appear in ethics codes (often they appear in the city charter), but because they do involve conflicts of interest, they should at least be included by reference. Please say how your municipality deals with this problem, or how you think it should be dealt with.

      Another common conflict provision is as follows: No person subject to this code shall accept other employment which will either impair his or her independence of judgment as to his or her public duties or employment or require or induce him or her to disclose confidential information acquired by him or her in the course of and by reason of his or her official duties. What does it mean to have a job that impairs one's independence of judgment, or a job that induces or requires one to disclose confidential information? And how could it be proven that particular employment could do this? Again, this sort of provision focuses on the conflict rather than on the improper management of the conflict. It is true that a developer should not be on a zoning board, nor should a contractor be in charge of a city's purchases, at least in the relevant area. But in and of themselves, these are not violations of the public trust (so long as they recuse themselves when appropriate; but if that is very often, they are not fulfilling the obligations of their position); they are examples of seriously poor judgment on the individual's part as well as on the part of those who nominated or appointed that individual. In addition, when a developer sits on a zoning board, it is a sign of a poor ethics environment, whose leaders have not spoken out against so severe a conflict. Cities may want to add a provision like the following to deal with this situation:

      The recusal provisions of 100(3) do not permit an official or employee to make use of recusal on a regular basis. If recusal occurs with such frequency as to give the appearance of impropriety, the official or employee is deemed to have violated the provisions of this code.

      Comment: An official or employee who is forced to recuse himself or herself on a regular basis should resign from his or her position. This should also be taken into account when a position is accepted.

      Another approach to conflicts of interest is to deem something a conflict only to the extent that an interest is not disclosed and the official or employee participates in the matter. This approach recognizes that ignoring a conflict is the principal problem. Such an approach can be combined with defining "conflict of interest" as doing or not doing much of what appears in 100 of this model code, as it is, for example, in Kings County (Seattle), Washington. This makes it clear that the central concept of a conflict of interest takes many forms, but it also limits conflict to particular instances, in effect, saying that all other conflicts are acceptable.

      New Haven, Connecticut enumerates several examples of conflicts of interest, as well as several exceptions. This is unusual, but if done thoughtfully and responsibly (being careful not to make the examples exclusive), it can provide clear guidance. The best place for such examples is, however, not in the code itself, but in explanatory guidelines on the city website or in pamphlet form. Here is what New Haven lists:

      Sec. 12 5/8-6. Exception to the conflict of interest provisions.

      The following situations shall not constitute a conflict of interest under section 209 of the Charter of the City of New Haven:

      1. Where a municipal employee or public official is employed by a person who enters into a contract with the City of New Haven, where said employee or public official is not directly involved in the procurement, preparation, or performance of such contract and whose remuneration is not, directly or indirectly, derived from said contract;
      2. If the municipal employee or public official is employed by any newspaper which publishes any municipal notice, resolution, ordinance or other proceeding where such publication is required or authorized by law;
      3. If the municipal employee or public official is employed by a public utility that furnishes public utility services to the City of New Haven when the rates or charges therefor are fixed or regulated by the public utilities control authority;
      4. If the municipal employee or public official is employed by a person or business which has a contract with the City of New Haven if the total consideration thereunder, when added to the aggregate amount of all consideration payable under contracts in which said employee or public official has an interest during a calendar year does not exceed five hundred dollars ($500.00).

      Sec. 12 5/8-7. Examples of an interest requiring disclosure.

      In accordance with article XXIII, section 210, of the Charter of the City of New Haven, interests requiring disclosure shall include, but not be limited to the following:

      1. Where a member of the immediate family of a member of a board, commission or task force is employed by the City of New Haven;
      2. Where a member of a board, commission or task force is employed by a nonmunicipal agency the funding of which is, in part or in its entirety, provided by funds authorized by the City of New Haven;
      3. Where a member of a board, commission or task force serves on the board of directors or governing board of a nonprofit organization when said organization is engaged in the application of federal, state or local funding authorized by the City of New Haven;
      4. Where a member of a board, commission or task force serves on the board of directors or governing board of a nonprofit organization when said organization is lobbying for specific legislation before the City of New Haven or when said organization is lobbying for specific State of Connecticut legislation which will result in the city receiving funding which is controlled by the city board, commission or task force of which the individual is a member;
      5. Where a member of a board, commission or task force serves on the board of directors or governing board of a nonprofit organization when said organization is engaged in litigation against the City of New Haven;

      6. Where a member of a board, commission or task force accepts an offer of employment, whether paid or unpaid, by the City of New Haven or by a program recommended by said task force but has not yet resigned or retired from said board, commission or task force to accept said offer of employment;
      7. Where a municipal employee or public official has a financial or personal interest in a contract which was entered prior to the time of his nomination, appointment, election or employment to said position, so long as said contract is not renewed, amended or modified subsequent to his assuming public office;
      8. Where an employee or public official seeks or obtains employment with a person, company or corporation engaged in business with the City of New Haven but has not yet resigned his position assume said employment;
      9. Where an employee or public official applies for a city program or benefit over which he has control, influence or discretionary authority.

      2. Legislators Employed by City

      To discuss this provision, click here.

      A member of the legislative body has a conflict of interest with respect to any labor contract to which he or she, or a member of his or her household*, may be a party, and with respect to an appropriation to any city department or agency through which he or she, or a member of his or her household, is employed.

      Comment: Some cities require that there be no incompatible or even multiple offices held by an individual, especially a council member, so that this problem could only arise with respect to members of the household. In towns and small cities, it is more difficult to make such requirements, because there are sometimes too few competent and interested people to go around. Also, recusal can take care of instances such as those described in this subsection. But explicit restrictions in this area, especially in large cities, can be valuable.

      3. Recusal

        To discuss this provision, click here.
      1. An official or employee* must refrain from acting on or discussing, formally or informally, a matter before the city, if acting on the matter, or failing to act on the matter, may personally* or financially benefit* any of the persons or entities listed in subsection 1 of this section. Such an official or employee should join the public if the recusal occurs at a public meeting, or leave the room if it is not a public meeting.
      2. An official or employee* must refrain from acting or discussing, formally or informally, a matter involving a person who appointed or recommended him or her for that position, if he or she is aware of such appointment or recommendation.
      3. If a board or agency member is requested to recuse himself or herself with respect to a matter, for the reason that he or she has a conflict of interest, by

        1. another member,
        2. a party to the current matter, or
        3. anyone else who may be affected by a decision relating to this matter, the member must decide whether to recuse himself or herself.

        If the member decides not to recuse himself or herself, the unchallenged members must consider any relevant evidence concerning such claimed conflict of interest, as defined in this code, and vote whether or not to allow the request and require that the member refrain from participating in the matter.

      4. Rule of Necessity: If recusal would leave a board with less than a quorum capable of acting, or if the official or employee* is the only person authorized by law to act, the official or employee* must disclose the nature and circumstances of the conflict to the Ethics Commission and ask for an advisory opinion pursuant to 104 and 209.

      Comment: "Acting on and discussing, formally or informally" means that the official should withdraw from any involvement with the matter, including conversations, appearances at meetings or portions of meetings concerned with the matter, and voting on the matter, except, of course, in a public referendum.

      Sometimes inaction benefits an official or his or her close associates - for example, when a code enforcement official fails to cite her brother for a zoning violation. That is why this subsection prohibits an official's inaction, as well as action, in certain circumstances. In such an instance, the enforcement official should ask someone else to handle the matter.

      See 101 for provisions concerned with the disclosure of a conflict pursuant to this subsection. Because disclosure in this sort of situation occurs at the time a conflict becomes immediately relevant to an action or transaction to be taken by an official or employee, this is referred to as "transactional disclosure."

      4. Gifts*

      To discuss this provision, click here.
      1. An official or employee*, his or her spouse or domestic partner*, child or step-child, parent, or member of his or her household*, may not solicit nor accept anything of value from any person or entity that the official or employee knows, or has reason to believe, has received or sought a financial benefit*, directly or through a relationship with another person or entity, from the city within the previous three years, or intends to seek a financial benefit in the future.
        If in doubt, the official or employee should refrain from soliciting or refuse a gift, and should first inquire into the person or entity's relationship with the city. [or: If the official or employee* does not know whether a person or entity fits this description, he or she should inquire and, if it is discovered that the person or entity does fit this description, the gift should be returned (or its monetary value if it cannot be returned) and no further gifts accepted during the relevant period.]

      2. Gifts of property, money, or services given nominally to the city must be accepted by a resolution of the legislative body.



      Comment: The first sentence of subsection 4a is difficult, even if the language itself is not. Here it is broken down and explained:

      Who cannot accept or solicit gifts: An official or employee, his or her spouse or domestic partner, child or step-child, parent, or member of his or her household

      What a gift is: anything of value (see the definition at 111(6) and the exceptions in 102)

      Whom one cannot accept gifts from: any person or entity that has received or sought a financial benefit from the city within the previous three years, or that intends to seek a financial benefit in the future.

      Must the gift giver have directly received or sought a financial benefit from the city? No, it also counts if it sought a financial benefit through a relationship with someone or some entity

      What the official or employee must know about the gift giver's relationship with the city: he or she must know the gift giver's relationship with the city, or know enough that he or she has reason to believe that such a relationship may exist. If uncertain, the gift should be refused and questions asked.

      With respect to higher officials and department heads, and for officials and employees who deal directly with contractors and permitees, a city might choose to prevent them from receiving any gifts at all, other than campaign contributions and gifts from close relatives.

      Cities have taken a great variety of approaches to the gift problem. The approach here is to limit only gifts from people and entities that do business with or otherwise get financial benefits from the city, including permits, zoning approval, etc. Other common approaches are to limit the amount of gifts or to limit the type of gifts or the type of givers.

      There are two principal goals here: (1) to give clear guidance to officials, employees, and potential gift givers; and (2) to ensure city residents that their public servants are not accepting gifts from people and businesses who might be trying to influence them, whether or not that is a purpose for the gift (since no one can ever know the purpose).

      The choice of the above approach is intended to keep the process simple: if there is any question of the giver's relationship with the city, do not accept the gift. If there is any reason to believe there is an improper motive behind the gift, do not accept it. There are exceptions to this rule below (at 102), but they are few and essentially allow just a lunch or two each year.

      Another approach to gift-giving is to require the annual disclosure of all gifts either by itself or in addition to prohibitions. This puts a great deal of pressure on the city's informal oversight resources (citizen and media), since such gifts would be out of the jurisdiction of official boards. Since party organizations provide the most effective informal oversight in most communities, depending on disclosure will politicize this part of the city's ethics process. Here is language for that approach:

      Officials and employees must file with the Ethics Commission, on or before January 31, a list of all gifts received during the preceding calendar year by them or by their spouse or domestic partner, child or step-child, parent, or member of their household, to the extent that the aggregate amount of gifts received from an individual or entity (including gifts from all employees, partners, or investors) during the year is $50 or greater. Information to be disclosed is as follows:

      1. the date the gift was received and who received it;
      2. a description of the gift;
      3. the fair market value of the gift;
      4. the name, address and employer of the person who provided the gift;
      5. the name of any organization or individual represented by the person or on whose behalf the person was acting in providing the gift.

      Another common approach, which I included as an alternative in my original text, is to make it a violation of the ethics codes to take gifts with an understanding that some action will occur or not occur in return (usually the language includes the word "influence"). The problem is that this is not an ethical issue, but rather a crime. The gift is no longer a gift, but a bribe. Ethics commissions have no jurisdiction over this sort of crime, so it is best that this language not appear in an ethics code.

      Please provide language for alternative approaches, and provide arguments for and against approaches, as well as instances where certain approaches have worked or not worked, in terms of providing guidance as well as limiting questionable gift-giving.

      5. Special Consideration

      To discuss this provision, click here.

      An official or employee* may not grant or receive, directly or indirectly, any special consideration, treatment, or advantage beyond what is generally available to city residents.

      Comment: See the exception in the second sentence of subsection 6 below, which also applies here.

      Some cities use the language of misuse of office (or of the "prestige" of office) here. I think it is unnecessary, but here is the IMLA Model Code version:

      No public servants shall use or attempt to use their official positions improperly to unreasonably request, grant, or obtain in any manner any unlawful or unwarranted privileges, advantages, benefits or exemptions for themselves, or others, and no public servants shall use, or attempt to use, their positions to avoid the consequences of illegal acts for any person; nothing in this provision shall be construed to prohibit or discourage any public servant from performing any official duty or action zealously and enthusiastically.

      6. Representation

      To discuss this and the following provision (Appearances), click here.

      An official or employee* may not represent any other person or entity before the city, nor in any matter not before the city, but against the interests of the city. However, it is acceptable for elected officials to represent constituents without compensation in matters of public advocacy.

      Comment: The second sentence of this subsection recognizes that officials are elected to serve their constituents. Thus, for example, when a resident complains to a council member that the public works department blocks the resident's driveway with snow, a council or board member must be able to pursue that complaint with the proper city authorities.

      Some cities go into more detail and cover more people in their limitations on representation. Such provisions include the representation by business associates of officials and employees, and acting as an expert witness before the official or employee's board or agency.

      7. Appearances*

      To discuss this and the previous provision (Representation), click here.

      An official or employee* may not appear* before any city department, agency, board or commission, except on his or her own behalf or on behalf of the city. Every time an official or employee appears before the meeting of any municipal body, or when he or she writes a letter to the editor or other publicly distributed writing, he or she is required to disclose before speaking or clearly on the writing whether he or she is appearing in an official capacity or as a private citizen. If the speech or writing is in response to criticism or other communication directed at or regarding his or her official role, the official or employee may respond only in his or her official role.

      Comment: Subsections 6 and 7 appear to overlap, because one who represents another usually makes an appearance. However, it is much more clear when an "appearance" has been made than when there is a "representation" relationship, so including both makes it more clear what conduct is being prohibited. Also, subsection 6 includes representation of private interests outside of the city's own boards and departments, when it is against the interests of the city, usually but not exclusively when the city is a party to business or a proceeding. And subsection 7 deals with appearances where the official is representing himself or herself, but it is not clear which hat the official is wearing.

      Again, the general rule is that if others see your relationship with a person or entity as "representation," then you should not do it, because it would be perceived as a conflict with your principal role of representing the city. Similarly, if your appearance at a meeting or in writing does not appear to be in the city's interest, you should not appear.

      Why are officials and employees restricted from appearing before boards or agencies other than their own? Because restricting only appearances before your own board or agency would, for example, allow a code-enforcement official or the city attorney to represent private clients before the city planning board, because those officials are not members of that board. It would be very difficult to list every possible instance where an appearance before other boards and agencies would be inappropriate. When there is no such conflict, an official or employee should obtain a waiver from the Ethics Commission pursuant to 210.

      Some municipalities may go beyond actual representation, and include assistance or legal assistance, with an exclusion for representation or assistance in the performance of the official or employee's official duties.

      For volunteers, towns might want to limit restrictions on representation and appearances to their own board or commission, especially those on boards where the opportunity for conflict elsewhere is very small, such as the library board. A list of boards where this exception applies could be added to a subsection 8 that read:

      8. Volunteer members of the following boards and commissions may represent persons and entities before, or appear before, any town department, agency, board, or commission other than their own.

      8. Confidential Information

      To discuss this provision, click here.

      An official or employee*, a former official or employee, a contractor or a consultant* may not disclose any confidential information obtained formally or informally as part of his or her work for the city or due to his or her position with the city, or use any such confidential information to further his or her own or any other person or entity's personal* or financial interests*.

      Comment: Some cities will want to define "confidential information" more exactly. Here is possible definition language, based on the IMLA Model Code:

      "Confidential information" means information obtained in the course of holding public office or employment, or as a contractor to the city, which is not available to members of the public and which the official or employee* is not authorized to disclose, except to designated individuals or bodies, including written and non-written information. When such information is also available through channels open to the public, officials and employees* are not prohibited from disclosing the availability of those channels.

      The IMLA Model Code states explicitly, in its confidential information provision, that an ethics commission is, effectively, considered a designated body.

      9. Political Solicitation

      To discuss this provision, click here.

      An official, employee, or municipal candidate may not knowingly request, or authorize anyone else to request, that any subordinate* or potential future subordinate participate in an election campaign or make a political contribution. Nor may he or she engage in any political activity while on duty for the city, with the use of city funds, supplies, vehicles, or facilities, or during any period of time during which he or she is normally expected to perform services for the city, for which compensation is paid.

      Comment: Political solicitation of subordinates by an official fosters the appearance,

      if not the reality, of coercion. The word "knowingly" here means that neither an official nor a campaign committee is required to cull the names of municipal officials from voter registration lists it mails to. However, a targeted mailing to municipal officials is prohibited.

      Similarly, candidates are barred from soliciting from appointed officials and employees who may fear reprisal, such as being fired, if they refuse to aid the candidate's campaign, even if they do not currently work under that candidate.

      Note that this code does not restrict voluntary political contributions or political activity by any official or employee.

      Some municipalities may wish to add a bar on soliciting from persons or entities that have sought or received a financial benefit from the municipality within the previous twenty-four months.

      10. Patronage

      To discuss this provision, click here.

      No official or employee* may promise an appointment or the use of his or her influence to obtain an appointment to any position as a reward for any political activity or contribution.

      Comment: As has been shown so skillfully in Chicago, patronage involves both promises of jobs in return for political activity, and the threat of losing jobs in return for political activity, so that patronage continues on forever. Even the Shakman Decree of 1983 did not put an end to the Chicago patronage system: it just went underground. It was twenty years before the new version, based on fraud, was taken on.

      Most ethics codes do not include patronage provisions, although many do prohibit asking subordinates to participate (however, this can occur without implicit requests or threats). Patronage involves the most basic conflict of interest in government: the conflict between holding on to power and acting in the public interest. A city government based on patronage cannot have a truly ethical environment, because most of its officials and employees are there on the basis of a quid pro quo/special consideration relationship, which is inconsistent with ethics.

      I would like to hear how various cities have dealt with or ignored patronage as an ethics issue.

      11. Revolving Door

      To discuss this provision, click here.
      1. For a period of one year after the termination of his or her city service or employment, an official or employee* may not appear* or practice before any city department, agency, board or commission, except on his or her own behalf, or on behalf of the city if serving on a volunteer basis. For this same period, an official or employee* may not receive compensation for working on, or having associates working on, any matter before any city department, agency, board or commission. With respect to particular matters on which the official or employee personally worked while in city service or employment, this bar is permanent. The foregoing also applies, during the same periods of time, to any individual who is a partner, associate, or member of a person or entity with which the former official or employee* has a official or employee* not accept employment with a party to a contract with the city, within a year after the contract was signed, when he or she participated substantially in the negotiation or award of the contract and the contract obliged the city to pay at least $50,000. Nor may an elected or appointed official accept any appointment or election by the body of which he or she is or was a member, to any position which carries with it any officials and employees* who performed only ministerial acts* while working for the city.

      Comment: If this bar creates a particular hardship for, say, a lawyer working on his own, the Ethics Commission may grant a waiver under 210.

      "Personally worked" means the official actually worked on the matter, not that he or she supervised a department that worked on the matter.

      Some municipalities may prefer a time limit greater than a year, but they should consider that the longer the bar, the more difficult it might be to hire qualified officials or find qualified candidates for office.

      Allowing former officials to immediately work for the city as consultants would allow the official to continue to act in the city's interest, but such an exception would allow for sweetheart deals between the city and former officials, who normally have the edge in competing with vendors lacking their municipal contacts. Therefore, according to this subsection, a former official could consult to the city only on a volunteer basis.

      This code seems to restrict former officials more than current officials. However, former officials are subject only to the revolving door and confidential information provisions, while current officials are subject to the entire panoply of restrictions in this code.

      Another approach to the revolving door deals with the act of discussing or accepting employment while the official or employee is still serving the city. The problem with this approach is that it requires proof of a quid pro quo, which is difficult, and ignores the appearance of impropriety that accompanies the revolving door. Here is typical language for this approach:

      It is a violation of this code to discuss or accept an offer of future employment with any person doing or seeking to do business with the city if the official or employee knows or has reason to believe that the offer of employment was or is intended, in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, as compensation or reward for an act or failure to act during the course of city employment or to influence city action.

      The other side of the revolving door may also be dealt with in language like the following:

      It is a violation of this code for an official or employee* to, within one year of entering city employment or service, award a contract or participate in an action benefitting a person that formerly employed him or her.

      12. Misuse of City Property and Reimbursements

      To discuss this provision, click here.

      An official or employee* may not use, or permit others to use, any property owned by the city for profit or personal convenience or benefit*, except (a) when available to the public generally, or to a class of residents, on the same terms and conditions, (b) when permitted by policies approved by the city's legislative body, or (c) when, in the conduct of official business, used in a minor way for personal convenience. This applies not only to objects such as cars and trucks, but also to travel and other expense reimbursements, which may not be requested for nor spent on anything but official business.

      Comment: The IMLA Model Code takes this further by requiring care in the use of city property, so that there is no waste. This is an essential element of government ethics, but it is a difficult thing to put into law. People - especially opposition parties - often paint other people's actions as wasteful and negligent. The duty to use city property and resources with care belongs in the aspirational section of an ethics code, or it invites frivolous complaints, making it almost impossible to reject any complaint as frivolous.

      13. Nepotism

      To discuss this provision, click here.
      1. Unless he or she obtains a waiver pursuant to 210, no official or employee* may appoint or hire his or her spouse or domestic partner*, child or step-child, sibling or step-sibling, parent, or member of his or her household* for any type of employment, including by contract (unless competitively bid), with the city.

      2. No official or employee* may supervise or be in a direct line of supervision over his or her spouse or domestic partner*, child or step-child, sibling or step-sibling, parent, or member of his or her household*. If an official or employee* comes into a direct line of supervision over one of these persons, he or she will have six months to come into compliance or to obtain a waiver.

      14. Transactions with Subordinates

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      No official or employee* may engage in a financial transaction, including the giving or receiving of loans or monetary contributions, including charitable contributions, with a subordinate* or person or business over which, in the official or employee's* official duties and responsibilities, he or she exercises supervisory responsibility, unless (a) the financial transaction is in the normal course of a regular commercial business or occupation, or (b) the financial transaction involves a charitable event or fundraising activity which is the subject of general sponsorship by a state or municipal agency through official action by a governing body or the highest official of state or municipal government.

      Comment: Exception (b) allows for United Way campaigns and the like, but officials should be careful not to abuse this exception by getting pet charities approved by the mayor or city manager. Too often, charities are as much about the official as elections are, and even good causes should not be aided through coercion.

      Some cities might also want to except situations where the subordinate or business offers or initiates the financial transaction, but this exception can be abused in instances where a subordinate or business acted under pressure and does not feel in a position to anger a supervisor or someone responsible for handing out contracts.

      Some cities might also want to broaden the range of relations that constitute nepotism to include, say, aunts and uncles, nephews and nieces, and direct in-laws.

      15. Fees and Honorariums

      To discuss this provision, click here.

      No official or employee* may accept a fee or honorarium for an article, for an appearance or speech, or for participation at an event, in his or her official capacity. However, he or she may receive payment or reimbursement for necessary expenses related to any such activity.

      16. Endorsements

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      No official or employee* in his or her official capacity may publicly endorse products or services. However, this does not prohibit an official or employee from answering inquiries by other governmental officials, consumer organizations, or product information services regarding products or services.

      17. Consultants*

      To discuss this provision, click here.

      A consultant* may not represent a person or entity other than the city in any matter, transaction, action, or proceeding in which the consultant participated personally and substantially as a consultant to the city. Nor may a consultant represent a person or entity in any matter, transaction, action, or proceeding against the interest of the city.

      Comment: Other rules that apply expressly to consultants are 100(8) (Confidential Information), 100(21) (Honesty in Application for Positions), and 101(2) (Transactional Disclosure). Also see the comments to 100(11), the revolving door provision.

      Many codes also include language such as: A consultant may not accept other employment that will either impair the consultant's independence of judgment with respect to the consultant's official duties for the city, or that will require or induce the consultant to disclose confidential information pursuant to subsection 8 of this section. The same problem appears as in the comments to 100(1) above: how does one know or prove that employment will impair someone's judgment or induce someone to disclose confidential information? It is enough that consultants are prevented from representing parties against the city or in matters the city hired them to deal with, and that they be included in the confidential information provision, 100(8).

      18. Complicity with or Knowledge of Others' Violations

      To discuss this provision, click here.

      No one may, directly or indirectly, induce, encourage, or aid anyone to violate any provision of this code. If an official or employee* suspects that someone has violated this code, he or she is required to report it to the relevant individual, either the employee's supervisor, the board on which the official sits or before which the official or employee* is appearing* or will soon appear, or the Ethics Commission if the violation is past or if it is not immediately relevant to a decision, to discussion, or to actions or transactions. Anyone who reports a violation in good faith will be protected by the provisions of 110.

      Comment: This subsection seems to turn all city officials and employees into stool pigeons. But, in fact, a principal reason why ethics programs are ineffective is that officials and employees feel they can get away with unethical conduct because no one will turn them in. Instead of having a culture based on ethics, their city has a culture based on loyalty. People in such a city ignore conflicts of interest, because they feel protected. There are two reasons for this: (i) no one wants to be a tattle-tale and (ii) everyone is afraid to be a tattle-tale, because doing so might threaten their jobs, lead to harassment and failure to advance, or undermine their relations with people in power.

      This subsection, along with the whistle-blower protection in 110, allows the people who know most what is going on in city government - city employees - to safely foster an ethical environment by preventing action in the public interest from being against their self-interest. The inclusion of this provision makes it clear to all officials and employees that government ethics is a group activity, that unethical behavior is less an individual problem than an organizational problem.

      Such a provision appears in the IMLA Model Code; the comments to the IMLA provision state, in part, "Even if a community ultimately decides not to impose any duty [to report violations], it would be better off for having debated the issue."

      Whether or not anonymous reports would be accepted is another area for debate. Creating a hotline for reports of violation (anonymously or not) makes it easier for city employees and others to fulfill their duty to report violations. As long as the ethics commission can file its own complaint in such an instance, there is the protection for respondents that the ethics commission must feel satisfied, after a preliminary investigation, in the truth of the report. People's experiences with such hotlines, good and bad, would be very helpful, as would information about debates about the duty to report and about hotlines and anonymous reporting of violations.

      Back to tattling, which is rarely defended in a rational way. Not tattling is something very important in childhood, where it helps maintain solidarity of children against adults. But for adults there is not a group to maintain solidarity against (hopefully not the city's residents, to whom officials have a fiduciary duty) and, therefore, this sort of unquestioning loyalty is inappropriate. The best thing to do, before reporting, is to try to prevent unethical conduct before it occurs, to directly recommend, for example, that someone recuse himself or herself or seek advice from the ethics commission. But it is important that officials and employees know that unethical conduct will not be protected by the silence of fear or misplaced loyalty.

      The first sentence of this subsection, on complicity and inducement, is equally important. Under most ethics codes, a private citizen or company that induces a municipal official to violate ethics laws runs no risk of penalty. For example, hoping to keep a city's business, a bank might give a personal loan to the city treasurer at a below-market interest rate. If this loan is discovered, the official might lose his or her job as a result; however, the bank will lose nothing and, more important, knowing this, it is more likely to offer the loan. Since the goal of this code is to prevent conflicts between the official's interests and the public interest, it is important that the code also make it less likely that officials are tempted into these conflicts. Please share your experiences with provisions such as this, including instances where suits have been brought, arguing that ethics commissions have no jurisdiction over anyone other than public servants.

      19. Falsely Impugning Reputation

      To discuss this provision, click here.

      An official or employee* may not falsely impugn the reputation of a city resident. If an official or employee* believes his or her accusation to be true, and then learns that it was false, even in part, he or she should apologize in the same forum the accusations were made. A failure to so apologize within a reasonable period of time after learning of the falseness of the accusations will create the presumption that the conduct was fully intentional.

      Comment: A common way for officials to intimidate residents who speak out and to prevent others from similarly speaking out is to use their positions of respect to falsely attack people who lack such positions, and thereby destroy their reputation and the legitimacy of their arguments, so that opposition from that individual and others will lessen. This form of misuse of office is central to undermining free debate as well as citizen oversight of executive and legislative actions.

      20. Meeting Attendance

      To discuss this provision, click here.

      All members of boards and commissions are expected to attend and be prepared for meetings. It is a violation of this code to miss or come unprepared to more than a third of a board or commission's meetings in a twelve-month period.

      Comment: If a member must miss or come unprepared for more than a small number of meetings, he or she should resign, whether or not his or her reasons are good ones. One can always ask to return to a position when one's health or schedule have improved.


      21. Honesty in Applications for Positions

      To discuss this provision, click here.

      No person seeking to become an official or employee,* consultant* or contractor may make any false statement, submit any false document, or knowingly withhold information about wrongdoing in connection with employment by or service for the city.


      To discuss other provisions, including those suggested below, click here.

      Additional Comment to 100: Some codes, including the IMLA Code, make it an ethical duty to comply with laws, including criminal laws, discrimination and sexual harassment laws, and lobbying laws. The chronic violation of more minor laws and rules is also sometimes cited.

      It is a difficult question whether to involve an ethics commission with every violation of law. Criminal and other undesirable activity by public servants certainly undermines the public trust in municipal government. But is the ethics process the right place to deal with such matters, or are they better dealt with by supervisors or, in the case of elected officials, by voters? The duty to comply with laws is not included here because, as long as the violation of other laws is made public, criminal and other proceedings should deal with them as well as the ethics process. However, if the violation is somehow hidden from the public, it might be appropriate for an ethics commission to make the violation public. Has anyone seen language to this effect?

      I believe that cities should consider special ethical guidelines and rules for city attorneys. This is a complicated area, where it is sometimes not clear what it means to represent the city (the mayor, the council, the public interest in such things as truth, openness, ane fair process). I feel that guidelines are important not only for attorneys, who often do not recognize the special conflicts they face, but also to protect the public interest, which is harmed by city attorneys who ignore conflicts in the name of representing their client. Who their client is in each sort of instance needs to be clarified. Attorney conflicts of interest are covered by their state's disciplinary rules, but (i) these rules are enforced by lawyers rather than city residents; and (ii) these rules do not deal with the special conflicts that city attorneys are faced with. I would like to see a discussion about it, including recommended provisions to deal with the problems practitioners, both lawyers and non-lawyers, have witnessed.

      101. Transactional Disclosure.

      To discuss this provision, click here.

      1. Whenever an official or employee* has reason to believe that he or she should recuse himself or herself under 100(3) of this code, he or she must:

      1. immediately refrain from participating further in the matter, formally or informally;
      2. promptly inform the appropriate individual or body, pursuant to subsection 3 below, that he or she has a conflict; and
      3. promptly file with the city clerk a signed statement disclosing the reasons for recusal or, if a member of a board or commission, state this information on the public record of that board or commission.

      Comment: In subsection 1(c) and in 104(2) there are references to placing information on the public record. This appears to assume that municipal meetings have a published transcript or, at least, a recording, video or aural, that is available to the public. But especially in smaller cities and towns, and in less important meetings, this is not the case. How have cities dealt with this problem of not having a public record to place disclosures on? Is it required that minutes include all disclosures?


      2. Whenever someone suggests or requests (privately or publicly) that an official or employee* recuse himself or herself under 100(3) of this code, and he or she chooses not to do so, he or she must promptly file with the city clerk a signed statement disclosing the reasons for refusing to recuse himself or herself or, if a member of a board or commission and if the suggestion was made publicly at a meeting of that board of commission, state this information upon the public record of that board or commission.

      Comment: See the comment to 100(3) for more information.


      3. An official or employee* is required to inform the appropriate individual or body pursuant to subsection 1b, as follows:

      1. If a member of a board, commission, committee, or authority, inform the chair or the entire body at a public or executive session; if the chair, inform the secretary;
      2. If not on such a body and appointed by the city manager/director of administration/mayor, inform the city manager/director of administration/mayor;
      3. If an employee of the Board of Education, inform the Superintendent of Schools;
      4. If the Superintendent of Schools, inform the chair of the Board of Education;
      5. If an elected official, inform the mayor;
      6. If a consultant,* inform the chair or head of the board, department, or agency that hired the consultant.

      4. An official or employee* with an interest in a contract must disclose this interest prior to the first of any of the following events:

      1. The solicitation of the contract.
      2. The bidding of a contract.
      3. The negotiation of a contract.
      4. The approval of the contract.

      5. An official or employee* need not file a disclosure statement pursuant to this section if he or she, with respect to the same matter, has, with respect to an interest in a contract with the city, filed a disclosure statement pursuant to this code.

      Comment: Transactional disclosure provides specific disclosure when a conflict arises, that is, when an official or employee's personal relationship or interest actually creates a conflict with the public interest. It is at this point that it is most important that the official or employee seriously consider the effects of this conflict on his or her actions or judgment, as well as the effects on how his or her involvement would appear to the public if it knew about the conflict.

      Subsection 3: These specific guidelines to informing of conflicts should be adapted to each city's particular form and structure.

      102. Exclusions from the Code of Ethics and from Transactional Disclosure.

      To discuss exclusions and waivers, click here.

      The provisions of 100 and 101 of this code do not require recusal or transactional disclosure as a result of:

      1. An action specifically authorized by statute, rule, or regulation of the State of __________ or of the United States.
      2. A ministerial act*.
      3. Gifts* (a) received by the official or employee* from his or her parent, spouse or domestic partner*, child or step-child, or sibling or step-sibling; (b) received by the official or employee, his or her spouse or domestic partner, child or step-child, parent, and member of his or her household*, from a person or entity (any person who works for or is otherwise related to an entity is considered as having given on behalf of that entity), having an aggregate value of $50 or less during any twelve-month period; or (c) accepted on behalf of the city and transferred to the city pursuant to 100(4)(b).
      4. Gifts* or financial benefits* having a value of $50 or less that are received by a city official or employee for the solemnization of a marriage officiated by that official or employee at a place other than his or her normal public place of business and at a time other than his or her normal work hours.
      5. Public awards from charitable organizations having a value of $100 or less.

      Comments: Subsection 3 contains an annual dollar limit for gifts given to an official or employee plus his close relations. Many ethics codes' dollar limits are per gift, usually around $50, in the belief that taking an official out to lunch is acceptable. However, such a limit is easy to get around by giving lots of small gifts to officials and their relatives, which add up to large gifts over time. Another way around such a rule is to give large gifts that are naturally spread out over time, such as a restaurant or club tab, or season tickets. Other codes' gift rules contain many detailed instances and amounts, for such things as private or public or charitable functions. A simpler rule, with an annual limit, is more clear and therefore provides better guidance. I would like to hear people's opinions about this, as well as their experiences with the approaches: how successful they've been, how they've been enforced, etc.


      103. Annual Disclosure.

      To discuss this provision, click here.

      1. Officials, Employees, and Others Who Are Required to File.

      Those holding the following job titles or positions are required to file a signed annual disclosure statement:

      1. Elected officials;
      2. Department heads and those authorized to act on their behalf (e.g., first deputies);
      3. Officials and employees* who hold policymaking positions, including members of municipal boards, such as ethics commissions, finance boards, planning and zoning boards, boards of zoning, buildings, and assessment appeals, wetlands and conservation boards, economic development boards, and parks and recreation boards;
      4. Officials whose job descriptions or whose actual duties involve:
        1. The negotiation, authorization, or approval of contracts, leases, franchises, revocable consents, concessions, variances, special permits, or licenses;
        2. The purchase, sale, rental, or lease of real property, personal property, or services, or a contract for any of these;
        3. The obtaining of grants of money or loans; or
        4. The adoption or repeal of any rule or regulation having the force and effect of law;
        5. candidates for elected office;
        6. political party committee officers; and
        7. relatives of officials and employees who, pursuant to subsection 5(d) of this section, are required to file because they are employed by the city, but who would not otherwise be required to file.

      2. Time and Place for Filing.

      a. Annual disclosure statements (for the calendar year) are to be filed with the Ethics Commission:

      (i) Within one-hundred-and-twenty days after the effective date of this section;

      (ii) Within thirty days after taking one of the job titles or positions listed in subsection 1 of this section; and

      (iii) No later than May 15 of each year thereafter.

      b. For candidates for elected office:

      (i) With the filing of the certificate of candidacy or declaration of intent.

      (ii) No later than May 15 of each year thereafter. If an annual disclosure statement is overdue and is not filed within 20 days after the candidate receives from the Ethics Commission written notice of the failure to file, the candidate is considered to have withdrawn his or her candidacy.


      3. Changes in Disclosed Information.

      Within thirty days after a change in the information contained in his or her most recently filed annual disclosure statement, an official, employee, or candidate must file a signed amendment to the statement (as in subsection 2), indicating the change.


      4. Contents of Annual Disclosure Statement.

      The annual disclosure statement will include:

      a. The location of any real property in the city, or within one mile of the boundary of the city, in which the person disclosing, or his or her relative*, has a financial interest*, and the type of financial interest.

      b. With respect to each outside employer or business* of the person disclosing:

      (i) Its name (if any);

      (ii) The nature of its business;

      (iii) If it is an entity, the type of entity;

      (iv) The person disclosing's relationship to it, such as sole proprietor, owner, partner, official, director, member, employee, bondholder, or shareholder.

      c. With respect to each outside employer or business* of the person disclosing's spouse or domestic partner*, the information required by paragraph (b) of this subsection.

      d. The names and addresses of all relatives* employed by the city as employees, contractors, or consultants*, including relatives* who work for or are subcontractors of contractors, consultants*, or subcontractors.

      e. Failure to disclose the information required by subsection 4 of this section with respect to a person disclosing's spouse or other relative* does not constitute a violation of that subsection if the person disclosing made a good faith effort to obtain the information and if he or she also sets forth those efforts in his or her disclosure statement.


      5. Any person who is subject to the disclosure provisions of this and the following subsection is required to obtain and preserve, for a period of three years following the date of the relevant disclosure statement, all accounts, bills, receipts, and other documents necessary to complete and substantiate such disclosure statement. These documents will be made available for inspection upon request by the Ethics Commission or its agent after reasonable notice.


      6. The Director of Finance must certify to the Ethics Commission, no later than May 15 of each year, a list of all business entities doing business with the city, currently bidding for business with the city, or that have done business with the city over the prior three years. This list will be made available to the public at no cost.


      Comment: While less significant than transactional disclosure, annual disclosure does fill an important role in an ethics program. In particular, annual disclosure reveals potential conflicts of interest before they arise and thus alerts the official - and the citizenry - to those potential conflicts. Annual disclosure thereby provides a check on transactional disclosure and protects officials by identifying potential ethical pitfalls, which the official can then take steps to avoid.

      Politicians often focus their condemnation of ethics codes on annual disclosure statements. They insist that forcing people to disclose their interests will prevent people from getting involved in city government. But the disclosure statements in this model code are far from what, say, U.S. Senators are required to file. No one is being asked to disclose how wealthy or poor they are. They are only being asked to say who their employer is (not what they're paid), what local companies they have financial interests in (not how big their interest is), what land they own in the municipality, and which of their relatives work for the city. The only people who will truly mind disclosing this information are those who have so many interests or involved relatives, or so much land in town, that they probably would face many conflicts of interest and, therefore, should probably not be involved in city government, except in areas that do not deal with businesses, developers, or contractors. After all, the biggest complaint people have about municipal governments is that they're run by local businessmen, developers, and contractors, those who represent them, and their relatives. This problem is only compounded when officials do not want to admit publicly what they do for a living.

      Some cities will want to go beyond these minimal disclosure requirements, especially for senior officials. Such cities will want annual disclosure of all information directly relevant to the ethics code, including all interests, direct and indirect, that might conflict with government responsibilities (see 100(1) above). Major debtors and creditors may also be listed, as well as any applications made to the city during the year. It may be specified that the disclosure statement is being filed under oath.

      Subsection 1: For the sake of clarity, each municipality should list the job titles or positions of the persons required to file annual disclosure statements.

      Subsection 2: May 15 was chosen because it is one month after personal income tax returns are due, providing them with both fresh information and the time to prepare the disclosure statement.

      Subsection 4: In the event a person disclosing, after a good faith effort, is unable to obtain the required information from an estranged spouse or from a relative, he or she need only set forth his or her efforts in the disclosure statement; there is no need to review land records.

      Subsection 6: Information in disclosure statements is useful only if it can be checked against information. That is the purpose of this subsection: to allow the comparison of an official's business connections with a list of businesses that do business with the city.

      Should failure to file a disclosure statement be a violation requiring a complaint to be filed, placing the burden on citizens or the ethics commission and requiring an investigation and hearing for a clear-cut violation? Or should the burden be on the person disclosing to file (at least a request for a 30-day extension), requiring from the ethics commission only a notice and a reasonable length of time before a stated penalty is automatically due?

      There have been cases, such as in Rhode Island, where a large number of officials did not file disclosure statements, making it almost impossible for the ethics commission to take action against them all (it is my understanding that they chose to go after the governor first). A late fee and serious penalty for not filing would require officials to take the requirement seriously. I would like to know others' experiences with enforcement of annual disclosure.


      104. Disclosure by Applicants.

      To discuss this provision, click here.

      1. When a person requests that the city, or a city official or employee*, take or refrain from taking any action (other than a ministerial act*) that may result in a financial benefit* to either any official or employee or to one of the other persons listed in 100(1) of this code, the person requesting must disclose the name of any such person or persons, to the extent of his or her knowledge at the time of the request.

      2. If the request is made in writing, the disclosure must accompany the request. If the request is oral and made at the meeting of a public body, the disclosure must be set forth in the public record of the body. If the request is oral and not made at the meeting of a public body, the disclosure must be set forth in writing and filed with the city clerk, who will send a copy to the Ethics Commission.

      Comment: An example of how this section works is that an applicant for a zoning variance is required to list the name of any city official or employee, or others listed in 100(1), who might benefit from the granting of the variance. Applicant disclosure provides a check on transactional and annual disclosure.

      This section does not require that the applicant research which officials, if any, have an interest in the matter, but only requires that the applicant disclose the names of interested officials to the extent the applicant knows of the interest. Also, the section imposes no burden on the applicant to update the disclosure if the applicant later learns that certain officials have an interest in the application.


      105. Advisory Opinions.

      To discuss advisory opinions, click here.

      1. Upon the written request of any official or employee*, including former officials and employees whose position was terminated within three years as well as people who intend to soon become an official or employee, the Ethics Commission must render, within ten days after the date of its next regular meeting, a written advisory opinion with respect to the interpretation or application of this code. Any other person or entity may similarly request an advisory opinion, but only with respect to whether his, her, or its own action might violate a provision of this code. If an earlier response is required, an informal verbal or e-mail opinion will be provided by the Ethics Officer. For more information about advisory opinions, see Section 209 of this code.

      2. Any person or entity may request informal advice from the Ethics Officer about any situation, including hypothetical situations, but such advice is not binding and there are no time requirements. With respect to the ASPA Ethics Code, only informal advice may be requested.

      Comment: For more information about advisory opinions, see 209, in the Administration part of this code. The Ethics Commission's other duties are set forth in the Administration part of this code, which is of interest to most people only in extreme situations. But all officials and employees, as well as many residents, will have occasion to take advantage of the Ethics Commission's or Ethics Officer's advice. And this is the Ethics Commission's most important responsibility. It is very important for local government officials and employees, whenever they are uncertain as to whether they should proceed with a matter, to immediately seek advice. This will prevent unethical conduct from occurring due to a lack of knowledge or understanding, and will create a series of precedents to guide officials and employees in the future.

      To avoid burdening the Ethics Commission with requests for formal advisory opinions, especially due to the urgency with which these opinions need to be provided to people faced with pressing decisions, this code permits a private citizen to request a formal advisory opinion only as to the permissibility of his or her own conduct. Any official, on the other hand, may request an advisory opinion with respect to his own, a subordinate's, a superior's, or even a colleague's conduct. But anyone can request informal advice about any situation.

      Usually, Ethics Officers work on a volunteer basis. They can be very helpful in providing quick advice before possible conflicts can cause problems. Ethics Commissions rarely meet often enough to provide timely advice, and town, city, and county attorneys rarely have the training, and rarely are unbiased enough, or seen as unbiased enough, to provide trustworthy advice. There is nothing worse than having an official told by a government attorney that he or she can do (or not do) something which, whether a violation of the ethics code or not, would undermine citizens' trust in their government officials. And yet this happens all the time. A truly neutral ethics officer can prevent this from happening.

      Cities might also consider allowing ordinary citizens to request advisory opinions when they believe there is a difficult conflicts question, and the relevant official or employee will not discuss the problem.


      106. Void Contracts.

      To discuss penalties relating to contracts, click here.

      Any contract, agreement, or other business transaction entered into by or with the city which results in or from a violation of any provision of sections 100 or 101 of this code is void, without further action taken, unless ratified by the city's legislative body in an open session held after applicable public notice. Such ratification does not affect the imposition of any penalties pursuant to this code or any other provision of law.


      107. Penalties for Violation of This Code.

      To discuss penalties and other relief, click here.


      To discuss negotiating with unions regarding penalties that apply to employees, click here.


      1. Resignation, Compensatory Action, Apology.

      Violation of any provision of this code should raise conscientious questions for the official or employee* concerned as to whether resignation, compensatory action, or a sincere apology is appropriate to promote the best interests of the city and to prevent the cost - in time, money, and emotion - of an investigation and hearings.

      Comment: An official should not compound ignoring a conflict of interest by again putting his or her personal interest ahead of the public interest by denying, obfuscating, or covering up what he or she knows to be true, or by, directly or indirectly, falsely accusing others of misconduct. An apology that includes sincere remorse and a willingness to make reasonable reparations restores respect and dignity, brings peace to personal and partisan rancor, assures the public that it is safe from further harm.


      2. Disciplinary Action.

      Any person or entity that is found to have engaged in action or inaction that violates any provision of this code may be reprimanded, suspended, or removed by the Ethics Commission, or the Ethics Commission may seek or impose any of the sanctions or remedies listed below or in 215.

      Comment: Many cities do not choose to allow ethics commissions to suspend or remove officials and employees. This can be a special problem where the employee is covered by a collective bargaining agreement. Below is alternative language for such cities:

      Any person or entity that is found to have engaged in action or inaction that violates any provision of this code may be reprimanded by the Ethics Commission. If the Ethics Commission recommends that the violator be suspended or removed from office or employment, or be subject to any other sanction or remedy authorized by law or collective bargaining agreement not listed in this section or in 215, the legislative body must choose, in an open session held after applicable public notice, whether and to what extent to impose such sanctions.

      Requiring the legislative body to make a determination on the ethics commission's recommendation is very important, because otherwise a council majority could prevent the matter from being debated (or they could dispose of it secretly in executive session).

      An alternative approach is to make it more clear what sort of violation of this code can lead to suspension or removal, and to require a supermajority, as in the following language:

      The Ethics Commission may suspend or remove a respondent from office, or employ other sanctions or remedies authorized by law or collective bargaining agreement not listed in this section or in 215. To suspend or remove a respondent, the violation must have been committed either with (i) fraudulent intent to secure the unjust enrichment of the respondent or another person or (ii) malicious intent to inflict pecuniary or other substantial injury upon another person. A respondent can be suspended or removed only by the vote of four members of the Ethics Commission.

      Two important limitations on an ethics commission suspending or removing employees must be taken into account: (i) union rules and procedures; and (ii) civil service rules and procedures. Since these vary greatly, each city must determine how to take these into consideration without undermining the Ethics Commission's enforcement powers, especially with respect to elected and appointed officials who are neither union members nor civil service employees (and most ethics proceedings involve such officials). Protection of union and civil service prerogatives can be used a way to take enforcement power out of the Ethics Commission's hands. Please share your experiences with union and civil service conflicts with ethics enforcement.

      When politicians do give this power to an Ethics Commission, especially one not of their choice, it makes a strong commitment to a neutral, non-politicized ethical environment and sends a clear message to people in the city government and to those who work with it.

      Please also share your experiences with ethics commissions that do have the power to suspend or remove employees, as well as with situations where this power is reserved to the legislative body or other individuals or bodies.


      3. Civil Fine.

      Any person or entity that violates any provision of this code may be subject to a civil fine of up to $2,000 for each violation, payable to the city. A civil fine may be imposed in addition to any other penalty authorized by this code or by law, other than a civil forfeiture pursuant to subsection 5 of this section.


      4. Damages.

      Any person or entity that violates any provision of this code is liable in damages to the city for any losses or increased costs incurred by the city as a result of the violation. Such damages may be imposed in addition to any other penalty authorized by this code or by law, other than a civil forfeiture pursuant to subsection 5 of this section.


      5. Civil Forfeiture.

      Any person or entity that intentionally or knowingly violates any provision of this code is subject to a civil forfeiture to the city of a sum equal to three times the value of any financial benefit* he, she, or it received as a result of the conduct that constituted the violation. A civil forfeiture may be imposed in addition to any other penalty authorized by this code or by law, other than a civil fine pursuant to subsection 3 or damages pursuant to subsection 4 of this section.


      108. Debarment.

      To discuss penalties relating to contracts, click here.

      1. Any person or entity that intentionally or knowingly violates any provision of this code is prohibited from entering into any contract, other than an employment contract, with the city for a period not to exceed three years.

      2. Nothing in this section may be construed to prohibit any person or entity from receiving a service or benefit, or from using a facility, which is generally available to the public.

      3. Under this section, a corporation, partnership, or other entity is not vicariously liable for the actions of an employee. A corporation, partnership, or other entity is not debarred because of the actions of an employee unless the employee acted in the execution of company policy or custom. A store, region, division, or other unit of an entity is not debarred because of the actions of an employee of that unit unless the employee acted at the direction, or with the actual knowledge or approval, of the manager of the unit.


      109. Injunctive Relief.

      To discuss penalties and other relief, click here.

      1. Any resident, official, or employee of the city may initiate an action or special proceeding, as appropriate, in a court of appropriate jurisdiction for injunctive relief to enjoin any person or entity from violating this code or to compel any person or entity to comply with the provisions of this code. In lieu of, or in addition to, injunctive relief, the action or special proceeding, as appropriate, may seek a declaratory judgment.

      2. No action or special proceeding may be prosecuted or maintained pursuant to subsection 1 of this section, unless (a) the plaintiff or petitioner has filed with the Ethics Commission a sworn complaint alleging the violation, (b) it is alleged in the complaint or petition filed with the court that at least six months have elapsed since the filing of the complaint with the Ethics Commission, and that the Ethics Commission has failed to issue a determination in the matter, and (c) the action or special proceeding is filed within ten months after the alleged violation occurred.

      Comment: This section addresses the failure of the Ethics Commission to act on a matter before it. When the Ethics Commission does act within the period prescribed by subsection 2, the remedy of the aggrieved party (the complainant or the alleged violator) lies in a proceeding to review the commission's determination (see 216). If the Ethics Commission files a determination in the matter after the 109 suit has been filed, the matter should proceed as a review proceeding, provided that the plaintiff or petitioner is aggrieved by the Ethics Commission's determination.


      110. Whistle-Blower Protection.

      To discuss this section, click here.

      1. Neither the city nor any person, including officials and employees*, may take or threaten to take, directly or indirectly, official or personal action, including but not limited to discharge, discipline, personal attack, harassment, intimidation, or change in job, salary, or responsibilities, against any official, employee, or other person (or against any member of their family) because that person, or a person acting on his or her behalf, (a) reports, verbally or in writing, or files a complaint with the Ethics Commission regarding an alleged violation of this code, or (b) is requested by the Ethics Commission to participate in an investigation, hearing, or inquiry, or is involved in a court action relating either to the alleged violation or to evidence presented or given as part of an Ethics Commission investigation or hearing. The provisions of this section are not applicable when the complainant, witness, or reporter of a violation made accusations or other statements that were malicious and false. A violation of this section is a violation of this code.

      2. Anyone who alleges a violation of subsection 1 may bring a civil action for appropriate injunctive relief, or actual damages, or both within ninety days after the occurrence of the alleged violation. A court may order reinstatement of the plaintiff to such a suit, or the payment of back wages, full reinstatement of fringe benefits and seniority rights, actual damages, or any combination of these remedies. A court may also award the plaintiff all or a portion of the costs of litigation, including reasonable attorney fees and witness fees. The initiation of such litigation is not a violation of the confidentiality provisions in 100(8) or 213(9).

      Comment: Without whistle-blower protection, city employees - the people who best know what is going on in the city government - will be unlikely to come forward with reports of ethics code violations. It is difficult enough to betray the strong feelings of loyalty that exist in most workplaces, and almost impossible when speaking out endangers your job and pension. With whistle-blower protection, city officials will know their violations might be reported and, therefore, will be more likely to act consistent with the code (that is, their personal interest in protecting themselves will be closer to the public interest in their acting fairly and impartially).


      111. Definitions.

      To discuss this section, click here.


      To discuss whether some provisions should apply only to certain officials, click here.


      Unless otherwise stated or unless the context otherwise requires, when used in this code:

      1. To "appear" or "appear before" means to communicate in any form, including, without limitation, personally, through another person, by letter, or by telephone. This definition also applies to the noun form, "appearance."

      2. "Consultant" means an independent contractor or professional person or entity engaged by the city and in a position to influence a city decision or action, or have access to confidential information.

      3. "Customer or client" in 100(1)(e) means (a) any person or entity to which a person or entity has supplied goods or services during the previous twenty-four months, having, in the aggregate, a value greater than $1,000, or (b) any person or entity to which an official or employee's* outside employer or business* has supplied goods or services during the previous twenty-four months, having, in the aggregate, a value greater than $1,000, but only if the official or employee knows or has reason to know the outside employer or business supplied the goods or services.

      4. "Domestic partner" is an adult, unrelated by blood, with whom an unmarried or separated official or employee* has an exclusive committed relationship, maintains a mutual residence, and shares basic living expenses.

      5. "Financial benefit" includes any money, service, license, permit, contract, authorization, loan, travel, entertainment, hospitality, gratuity, or any promise of any of these, or anything else of value. This term does not include campaign contributions authorized by law. A "financial interest" is a relationship to something such that a direct or indirect financial benefit has been, will be, or might be received as a result of it.

      6. A "gift" is a financial benefit* received or given without equivalent compensation. However, a financial benefit* received or given on terms available to the general public is not a gift.

      7. "Household" includes anyone whose primary residence is in the official or employee*'s home, including non-relatives* who are not rent payers or servants.

      8. An "interest in a contract" is a relationship to a contract such that a direct or indirect financial or other material benefit* has been, will be, or might be received as a result of that contract. The official or employee* does not need to be a party to the contract to have an interest in it. Indirect benefit includes a benefit to the official's family or outside business or employer.

      9. "Ministerial act" means an action performed in a prescribed manner without the exercise of judgment or discretion as to the propriety of the act. An example of a ministerial act is the granting of a marriage license by a city clerk.

      10. "Official or employee" means any official or employee of the city, whether paid or unpaid, and includes all members of an office, board, body, advisory board, council, commission, agency, department, district, administration, division, bureau, committee, or subcommittee of the city. "Official or employee" does not include:

      (a) A judge, justice, or official or employee of the court system;

      (b) A volunteer fire fighter or civil defense volunteer, except a fire chief or assistant fire chief; or

      (c) A member of an advisory board if, but only if, the advisory board has no authority to implement its recommendations or to act on behalf of the city or to restrict the authority of the city to act.

      11. "Outside employer or business" includes:

      (a) any substantial business activity other than service to the city;

      (b) any entity, other than the city, of which the official or employee* is a member, official, director, or employee, and from which he or she receives compensation for services rendered or goods sold or produced;

      (c) any entity located in the city or which does business with the city, in which the official or employee* has an ownership interest, except a public corporation in which the official or employee's ownership interest is the lesser of (i) stock valued at less than $50,000 or (ii) five percent of the outstanding stock; and

      (d) any entity to which the official or employee* owes, or by which the official or employee is owed, more than $10,000, either in the form of a note, a bond, a loan, or any other financial instrument.

      For purposes of this definition, "compensation" does not include reimbursement for necessary expenses, including travel expenses..

      12. "Personal benefit" includes benefits other than those that are directly financially advantageous. These include financial benefits* to relatives*, business associates, and others listed in 100(1), as well as non-financial benefits to these people and to oneself, including such things as reputation and the success of one's career. A "personal interest" means a relationship to something such that a personal benefit has been, will be, or might be obtained by certain action or inaction with respect to it.

      13. "Relative" means a spouse, child, step-child, brother, sister, parent or step-parent, or a person claimed as a dependent on the official or employee's* latest individual state income tax return.

      14. "Subordinate" means another official or employee* over whose activities an official or employee has direction, supervision. or control.


      Comment: Subsection 3 ("customer or client"): An employee of a large corporation may not know many of the customers or clients of his or her employer and should not be penalized for that understandable ignorance. For that reason, the "knows or has reason to know" language is included.

      Subsection 6 ("gift"): A "financial transaction -- on terms not available to the general public" includes, for example, a reduced-interest loan to a municipal official. The reduction in interest would constitute a gift.

      Subsection 11(c)("outside employer or business"): It is sometimes said that stock ownership in a public company is not relevant to an official's interests, because he or she owns a tiny percentage of the stock and therefore has no control over the entity. But the success of the public company does have special meaning to someone who holds a large dollar amount of that company's stock (even if that amount is large only for the individual, not for the corporation) and, therefore, it does constitute an interest that could get in the way of an official's ability to act impartially (as well as the perception of how the official would benefit from the company's success).

      The amount of share holdings will not be disclosed, but since there is a minimum amount, it will be clear that any disclosed share holding is sizeable. Therefore, some cities may want a lower threshold amount, so that it is not clear whether a shareholding is large or small.

      Subsection 12 ("personal benefit"): Many ethics codes require the expenditure of funds even with respect to personal benefits. But this requirement allows officials to vote, say, on whether they should have to recuse themselves, when a committee member raises the issue at a meeting. Non-financial interests, such as reputation, are very important to people and have an equally powerful effect on their ability to make impartial decisions. I would like to hear about examples of personal benefits you feel should be included as giving rise to a possible conflict of interest, and how you have seen such personal benefits dealt with when they are and when they are not covered by ethics codes.

      Subsection 13: Some cities follow the IMLA Model Code by defining "relatives," generally or in such instances as gift-giving, as anyone within up to the fifth degree of consanguinity. I feel that this term is inappropriate to an ethics code because of its unfamiliarity, its difficulty, and its common usage in law (determining incest). To be in the fifth degree of consanguinity, two individual's first common ancestor must be no more than a total of five generations away. For example, if my grandfather (two degrees) is your great-grandfather (three degrees), there are five degrees of consanguinity between us. In law, because consanguinity is for the purpose of defining incest, it does not include relationship by marriage. However, relationship by marriage is relevant in government ethics.

      Throughout this code there are stars next to defined words. If this usage is followed and the code is placed on a city's website, these stars should be turned into links to the Definitions section, so that the definitions can be easily consulted.



      Part B: Administrative Provisions

      201. Duties of City Clerk.

      The City Clerk must maintain on file for public inspection and, with respect to disclosure statements, index in alphabetical order by the last name of the relevant official, employee, candidate, or applicant the following documents:

      (1) A copy of the code of ethics and amendments thereto;

      (2) A statement that the city has established an Ethics Commission, and its composition;

      (3) A copy of the form of annual statement of financial disclosure;

      (4) A list of the names and offices, or positions, of all officials and employees required to file annual disclosure statements;

      (5) Copies of all transactional, applicant, and annual disclosure statements filed pursuant to this code.


      202 Maintenance of Disclosure Statements.

      1. The City Clerk must transmit promptly to the Ethics Commission copies of each transactional and applicant disclosure statement filed pursuant to sections 101, 103, and 104 of this code.


      2. The Ethics Commission must index and maintain on file for at least seven years all disclosure statements filed with it pursuant to sections 101, 103, and 104 of this code..


      203 Ethics Commission: Establishment; Qualifications of Members; Appointment of Members; Term of Office.

      To discuss the establishment and role of ethics commissions, click here.

      1. There is hereby established an Ethics Commission consisting of five members, plus two alternate members. All members and alternate members must be residents of the city.

      2. No member of the Ethics Commission may be, or have been within the three years prior to appointment, an appointed official or employee* of the city. Nor may a member of the Ethics Commission hold office in a political party or be employed or act as a lobbyist. An Ethics Commission member may make campaign contributions but may not participate in any election campaign.

      3. Of the regular membership of the Board, no more than two may be registered in the same political party, and at least one must be registered as unaffiliated. The alternate members may not be registered in the same political party.

      4. Within sixty days after the effective date of this code, and no later than December 31 each year thereafter, the city's legislative body will appoint the members of the Ethics Commission from a list of nominees prepared by the local branch of the League of Women Voters.

      Comment: Subsection 1: Five is not a magic number for an ethics commission. In large cities, if there is a lot of activity, it would be best to have a larger number of members, and then allow, say, five-member panels for proceedings, and three-member panels for advisory opinions. When there is little activity, it is often difficult to get a quorum at ethics commission meetings, so it is best to keep the number of members low. This is especially important since an ethics commission may only act by the majority vote of its total membership, not just those members who attend a meeting.

      Subsection 2: There are constitutional problems with excluding elected officials from ethics commissions, but it is a terrible idea to have an elected or appointed official on a commission that is supposed to be independent and without its own conflicts of interest. It undermines the spirit of the ethics code.

      The restriction on municipal officials and employees, and lobbyists and party officers, serving on ethics commissions seeks to ensure that the board is as free as possible from pressure from other officials, co-workers and superiors alike.

      Subsection 3: The restriction on the political make-up of the board aims to strengthen both the perception and the reality of a board that is not partisan. Ethics commissions must not become political footballs, because this will undermine trust in them and cause people not to file complaints or seek advisory opinions, nor to have faith in their determinations. For the same reason, this code restricts the political activities of ethics commission members.

      Subsection 4: The idea of having a nonpartisan civic organization select a city's ethics commission is unusual, but there are not many alternatives to preventing such a commission from being (and appearing) political or to ensuring that either party cannot block a member of its party from being disciplined or from getting no more than a reprimand. Another alternative is to require that each member be selected by unanimous vote of the legislative body, but this would still allow the parties to trade votes and make the same selections the two party committees would have made (or in fact did make). An ethics commission should be as nonpartisan, and without its own conflicts, as possible, and answerable to no one. Only a nonpartisan body can ensure this, at least on a city level (that is, without having a regional or state commission handle city ethics matters; see the next comment for more on this). In any event, instead of politicians (or even a nonpartisan civic organization) selecting only people they know, a vacancy on an ethics commission should be widely publicized, and citizens who are not politically involved should be encouraged to apply.

      Smaller municipalities may choose to form joint or regional ethics commissions or to contract out their ethics commission to another municipality. Since, in towns, most politically active residents have personal biases and relationships with those most likely to be brought before an ethics commission, a regional ethics commission can provide a truly neutral, independent solution. The decisions of a regional ethics commission will demand much more respect and make people more certain that ethical