Justification and Its Effect on Ethical Reasoning

One of the 'latest things' in politics today is Drew Westen, a psych professor who advises the Democrats that they should be paying more attention to emotions than to policies (as, many say, the Republicans have been doing), because people's emotional reactions have a great effect on how they vote.

What is the implication for ethics of what Westen and his colleagues are saying? An article in the July 10 New York Times said with respect to his research, 'the neural circuits responsible for positive emotions turned on as soon as the subject found a way to resolve the contradictions [between conflicting statements made by politicians they favor].' And Jonathan Haidt, another psych professor, is quoted as saying, 'reasoning, when we do it, is mostly to find justification for what we already believe.'

Is this true of ethical reasoning, as well? When we resolve ethical contradictions, for example the conflicts between our interests, do our neural circuits reward us, even when (or especially when) we come to a decision that allows us to ignore our conflict? How do we know that our ethical decisions are not simply another way of justifying how we feel, or making us feel good?

Is it cynical to think this way? Or is it only cynical to act on this knowledge, to attempt to take advantage of something that makes it very difficult for us to think clearly and with some objectivity? And how should ethics professionals deal with this tendency toward justification and wishing contradictions away?