In my previous blog post, the issue arose of voiding a planning and zoning commission's approval of a permit because one of the commission members had a conflict of interest. Connecticut law automatically invalidates the commission action, without any individual or body having to act. But this is unusual. In fact, most jurisdictions do not expressly provide for the avoidance of permits, contracts, or other transactions.

An unpublished Connecticut Superior Court opinion takes an odd approach to a conflict of interest charge against a member of a zoning commission in the small town of Pomfret (pop. 4,000). Not only is it odd, but it could very well be unconstitutional, as it partly bases its decision on whether individuals have spoken out for or against a matter before the zoning commission. My thanks go to Patricia Salkin, who wrote about the decision in her excellent Law of the Land blog and sent me a copy of the decision.

Do Chinese walls (that is, mechanisms that separate someone from information or involvement in a matter) work in conflict situations in government? And what considerations determine whether they work or not?

One consideration is whether, even with the Chinese wall, there is still an appearance of a conflict. Another consideration is whether the individual will still have access to the information or still be involved in the matter despite the Chinese wall; that is, whether the Chinese wall is really a Chinese screen.

There are two important Chinese walls in the news the last couple of days. One involves congressional representatives in the position of choosing defense-related earmarks and their access to information about which recipients of those earmarks made campaign contributions to them, at what amounts and at what times. The other involves what was apparently a sweetheart deal between Florida and the United States Sugar Company, where the governor's chief of staff's law firm represented U.S. Sugar in the negotiations.

Especially in small towns, bankers often have business relationships with many people and, therefore, do not make the best board and commission members on account of the many conflicts they have or, more frequently, the appearance of impropriety.

According to an article this week in the Asbury Park Press, in Long Branch, NJ (pop. 40,000) there is a dispute concerning the reappointment of a sewerage authority commission member, not a position that usually creates problems for bankers. But it turns out the situation reads like a question on a government ethics exam.

Your big brother is a powerful member of city council, and you're just a deputy city clerk. There's got to be more than this! So you retire, take your pension of $68,000, and run for state representative, with all the support your brother and his friends can provide, adding another $86,000 in salary and the prospect of a second government pension. Not bad.

But not enough. You set up a lobbying firm, "to help businesses engage" with the city, and you let your partner engage with the state, since you can't do that yourself. For an office from which to lobby city officials, including your brother, you find a bargain: in your brother's building, where you and he already have your constituent offices.

One thing I have scarcely mentioned in my blog are ethical rules related to a local board or commission when it is acting in a quasi-judicial manner. I mentioned the common-law conflicts in such circumstances in a recent blog post, as well as the absolute immunity given to the Philadelphia ethics board due to its quasi-judicial activities in another recent blog post.

But the only mention of an ethics law relating to quasi-judicial activities is in a comment to another recent blog post. The comment says that in Washington state, when a local legislative body acts in a quasi-judicial manner, there is an appearance of fairness standard relating to its members' conflicts.