The Perils of Nepotism

I was just reading <a href="http://www.economist.com/node/18483257?story_id=18483257&quot; target="”_blank”">a
review in <i>The Economist</i></a> of Francis Fukayama's new book, <a href="http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0374227349&quot; target="”_blank”"><i>The Origins
of Political Order</i></a>. The review made me think differently about
nepotism, a government ethics issue that is usually considered rather
minor.<br>
<br>
Some people may know that the Catholic Church instituted priestly
celibacy in the late 11th century in order to prevent the Church from
becoming a second aristocracy, handing on the Church's lands and power
to the children of Church leaders. But according to the review, Fukayama says that
celibacy was also "vital in the battle against corruption and
rent-seeking in the church, both of which were the typical consequences
of patrimony. The reforms gave the church the moral stature to evolve
into ... 'a modern, hierarchical, bureaucratic and law-governed
institution,'" and this in turn "set the ground rules for the
subsequent rise of the secular state."<br>
<br>

In other words, priestly celibacy in order to prevent nepotistic rule
of the Catholic Church led inexorably to modern government. Nepotism
and modern government do not go together. It may seem nice to have the
police chief hand over power to his son, but this is effectively
creating a small-time aristocracy that is not consistent with our form
of government.<br>
<br>
Fukayama also looks at China's dynasties in terms of nepotism, which he
calls "patrimony." He notes that the Han Dynasty was vulnerable to what
the reviewer calls "the hardwired human tendency to make ties of
kinship the primary criterion for conferring wealth, power and status."<br>
<br>
Fukyama came up with something of a rule on this topic: "There is an
inverse correlation between the strength of the centralized state and
the strength of patrimonial groups. Tribalism ... remains a default
form of political organization, even after a modern state has been
created."<br>
<br>
Chinese emperors and others found one good way to undermine
nepotism:  employing eunuchs in senior positions. Another
solution, employed by Muslim rulers especially, was the institution of
military slavery and the creation of one-generation nobility, where
elite slave troops were not allowed to marry. These are drastic responses to what some consider a minor problem.<br>
<br>
Why did these systems (other than priestly celibacy, which became
something else entirely) come to an end? One reason is that the
eunuchs and slaves became powerful interest groups, subverting the
states they had been created to defend. The societies fell back on good
ol' nepotism.<br>
<br>
Nepotism rarely subverts a local government, but it can ruin morale,
lead to more corruption, discriminate against people who are not in the
position to hand power on to members of their families, and cause new
groups to follow the old ways when they do attain power.<br>
<br>
Americans love dynasties, but they hate nepotism. I never liked
nepotism, but I hadn't realized how destructive it can be, and how much
of the history of government has been a response to forms of nepotism.<br>
<br>
Robert Wechsler<br>
Director of Research-Retired, City Ethics<br>
<br>
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