Spring Reading: Alan Rosenthal on Lobbying I

Although twenty years old and about the state level, Alan Rosenthal's The Third House: Lobbyists and Lobbying in the States (CQ Press, 1993) provides valuable food for thought about lobbying at the local level. This first of two posts looks at such topics as the importance of relationships to lobbying and what makes local lobbying so different.

One of the principal interests of this book is that it is based on interviews with lobbyists and, therefore, provides the lobbyist's point of view. The second post on this book ends with a few choice quotes from lobbyists.

Rosenthal says that lobbyists were originally called "lobby agents," that is, agents of companies that hung out in the lobbies of legislative buildings. It's too bad that the word "agent" was dropped from their name, because that makes it seem as if it's the lobbyists, rather than those they work for, that are problematic. This leads to too many lobbying codes putting the entire burden on lobbyists and, often, leaving clients totally outside the lobbying code's jurisdiction.

The book's introduction contains a good story that illustrates why it's so necessary to have a lobbyist. The Florida League of Cities was lobbying for a state program to facilitate urban development projects. State legislators demanded that the League come up with a revenue source to fund the program. The League settled on a sales tax on dry-cleaning. Why? Because the Florida dry-cleaning industry didn't have a lobbyist to oppose it. The dry-cleaning industry learned its lesson the hard way. But the story also illustrates how much the game of lobbying is about defense even more than about offense.

It's worth noting that, twenty years later, the "new" techniques of lobbying are the same ones considered "new" back then:  grass-roots mobilization, public relations and communications, polling, and coalition building. Somehow the old, "inside" types of lobbying are still what people — and most lobbying laws — consider lobbying. For this reason, in most jurisdictions the "outside" types of lobbying are still not being disclosed or otherwise regulated.

The Personal Touch
Why do so many elected officials become inside lobbyists? Rosenthal argues that "the qualities that count most in lobbyists are thought to be those normally possessed by legislators ... They know the issues, the process, and the people as well, or better, than anybody. They have built up relationships and friendships, which takes time and requires proximity." It is relationships and understanding of the process that count most in inside lobbying, and understanding of the players that counts most in outside lobbying.

The biggest problem with legislators becoming lobbyists is that they are not used to working on the details. That's what staff is for.

One reason influence is so personal is that legislators "identify the lobbyist first and foremost, the issue next, and then the client." Having a familiar lobbyist gives a client much greater access, no matter what the issue. At the local level, things are often much more simple, because there is no issue, and the client and the lobbyist are the same, that is, the business owner or nonprofit president does the local lobbying. Whoever it is, it is important to do what it takes to develop personal relationships with officials, including entertaining, going on trips and attending conferences together, and being involved in campaigns.

Cause lobbyists are at the other extreme. They are the least likely to develop personal relationships, because it is their issues rather than their familiarity that is most important and, in any event, they lack the resources for what it takes to develop personal relationships with any but their biggest supporters. They tend to engage mostly, but not exclusively, in outside lobbying and in developing relationships with the press.

In Lobbying, the "Minors" Are the Majors
Rosenthal explains in the first section of chapter 3 that lobbying is most important and effective when it comes to the minor bills and other matters that mean a lot to special interests, but little to the public. With respect to minor matters, there is an assumption that, if no one objects, the public interest is being served or, at least, not being undermined. So officials feel more free to serve personal interests.

Rosenthal figures that about a third of state bills are "minor" in this sense. At the local level, even more matters are "minor," because so much of what occurs there involves contracts, grants, and permits, which are of specific interest only to those seeking contracts, grants, and permits. This is also true of regulations. Only the big projects and issues get a lot of attention from community groups. With smaller projects, there are just the neighbors. Thus, local government has many more "minor," one-sided issues than state government and, therefore, is more open to special-interest lobbying. At the local level, it's the "minors" where the most important games are played, before audiences that are small, or non-existent.

Rosenthal gives as an example of a one-sided issue where lobbying has been especially successful. It is a bill that was killed year after year because there was only one lobbyist focused on it:  a local government ethics bill in New Jersey. The bill was killed by the lobbying of the state's local government officials' association. Eventually, an ethics bill was passed (after the book was published), but it created a weak program that the same association has been able to keep weak.

Local Lobbying Is Different in Many Ways
Besides the greater prevalence of "minor" matters at the local level, lobbying at the local level differs from lobbying at the state level in several important ways. One involves a principal role of the lobbyist:  monitoring the status of matters. At the state level, this is now relatively easy. But at the local level, things are usually not so transparent. This makes lobbyists who have connections and an understanding of the way things work especially valuable.

At the state level, "the real action is in the budget." At the local level, the real action is in land use. At the state level, taxes are the big issue. At the local level, the biggest tax issue is in-lieu-of-taxes payments by universities and hospitals. And contracts are much more important at the local level. At the state level, regulation is more important than at the local level, as are issues that bring out lots of lobbyists, but do not exist at the local level, such as tort reform, abortion, and gun control. Local lobbying's principal issue is one that plays a much smaller role at the state level:  development.

Throughout the book, Rosenthal considers the difference between defensive and proactive lobbying. At the state level, most lobbying is defensive, because most businesses and associations want to preserve the status quo, to keep taxes from rising, to keep regulation from getting more stringent, etc. At the local level, lobbyists need to be more proactive, because their clients are focused on initiating projects and getting contracts, grants, and permits. There is often no one on the defense, because while benefits are concentrated on one or two entities, costs are widely distributed and often not recognized at all.

Local government lobbyists are needed to facilitate action. To do this, a lobbyist must have a close relationship with officials so that the lobbyist can not only convince officials to act, but also be able to guide their actions by (1) drafting specifications and ordinances, (2) getting them to push aside obstacles in the contract and permit processes, and (3) convincing them to give money to their clients rather than to other businesses and organizations.

Another major difference between the state and local levels is that, at the local level, elected officials have fewer staff. Therefore, they need more help. Lobbyists can prove even more useful to them than to state officials by doing a lot of the work for them, including research, drafting, and professional advice in areas ranging from engineering to accounting. Rosenthal notes that this is also true in the smaller states and in those with less professional, part-time legislatures. The less support officials have, the more support they need from lobbyists.

At the local level, businesses seeking special benefits are smaller and, therefore, less likely to have an in-house lobbyist. Often the business owner or nonprofit president is the lobbyist. Local lobbying is more personal, less professional, and more direct.

The result is that people do not think of what goes on as "lobbying." Yes, the big developers and contractors sometimes hire contract lobbyists, but everyone else is just doing business. Therefore, cities and counties feel they don't need to register lobbyists, not to mention regulate their activities.

Another advantage lobbyists have at the local level is that local officials don't have a long commute. State representatives disperse to their home towns. Local officials are, by definition, at home. Therefore, all year long they socialize at the same bars and restaurants as lobbyists (including business owners), play golf and tennis at the same clubs, etc. This is a huge advantage that state and federal lobbyists lack.

Constituent services is an important part of some lobbyists' work, and constituent services are a very important part of the job of a local legislator or mayor. Those in the best position to provide constituent services are local universities and hospitals, social service agencies, arts organizations, and professional associations.

Local lobbyists can also be of great help building support for programs and bills that local legislators want to get through the council with the least amount of trouble. Lobbyists who help build support or put together coalitions for one program will likely get the sponsors' support for their own goals. Of course, the most important program for most elected officials is their campaign. The lobbyists in the best position to provide campaign and other community support are those that lead or represent organizations, associations, and unions that have lots of members in the community, as well as companies with lots of employees. And it is easier to do this kind of outside lobbying when the lobbyist has more direct contact with those who will participate.

Robert Wechsler
Director of Research-Retired, City Ethics

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