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Conflicts Involving Reputation and Government Positions

San Francisco's <a href="http://www.sfethics.org/ethics/2011/01/san-francisco-campaign-and-gover…; target="”_blank”">Conflict
of Interest code</a> has an unusual provision about voting on one's own
conduct or position. You would think this provision goes without
saying, but I can assure you it does not.<br>
<ul>
§3.210. Voting on Own Character or Conduct.<br>
(a) Prohibition. No officer or employee of the City and County shall
knowingly vote on or attempt to influence a governmental decision
involving his or her own character or conduct, or his or her
appointment to any office, position, or employment.<br>
<br>

(b) Exceptions. Nothing in this Section shall prohibit an officer or
employee from (i) responding to allegations, applying for an office,
position, or employment, or responding to inquiries; or (ii)
participating in the decision of his or her board, commission, or
committee to choose him or her as chair, vice chair, or other officer
of the board, commission, or committee.<br>
</ul>
This provision is really two provisions. The first involves matters of
character and conduct. The second involves an office or
position.<br>
<br>
<b>Character and Conduct</b><br>
It is unusual for an official to actually vote when the issue is his or
her character or conduct, but I have seen it happen. And those who do
this have a good argument, at least in terms of law. Most conflict laws
limit disclosure and recusal to financial interests and benefits, and
these do not include one's character or conduct.<br>
<br>
The fact that it seems as bad to be involved in matters of your own
conduct, other than publicly defending yourself, as it does to be
involved in matters where you may financially benefit makes the
financial-personal distinction seem very weak indeed. From the point of
view of personal vs. public interest, participation in matters
involving one's reputation is just as damaging. In fact, one's
reputation can be far more valuable than any particular financial
interest.<br>
<br>
Here's an example. A first selectman (effectively mayor) of my town once would not allow a
censure motion against him to be put on the agenda or even mentioned.
His reputation was extremely important to him, and he did not want the
public or the press to know what he had done. And he knew that if it
did not come up as an official action, the press would not report on
his alleged conduct, or even on the motion.<br>
<br>
Effectively, the San Francisco provision says that officials and employees have an
interest in (or benefit from) their reputation. Therefore, another way
to deal with this problem is to specify reputation in the definition of
"interest" and/or "benefit." In the alternative, personal benefits in
general can be added to financial interests, since there are other
instances of non-financial interests that are valuable to officials and
employees (see <a href="http://www.cityethics.org/content/we-do-not-live-financial-interests-al…; target="”_blank”">a
recent blog post</a> on this topic, as well as these: <a href="http://www.cityethics.org/node/740&quot; target="”_blank">1</span> and <a href="http://www.cityethics.org/node/635&quot; target="”_blank”">2</a>).<br>
<br>
<b>Office and Position</b><br>
The second part of the provision involves a more common problem: 
influencing decisions involving one's office or position.<br>
<br>
There have been two examples of this in my own town, one involving a
paid position, another involving an unpaid office. Although the chair
of a committee in my town did not vote on the selection of someone to
head the department her committee oversaw, it was apparent that she had
influence on the decision of the committee, especially because it was
asked to select three candidates and it selected only one, its own
chair. I dealt with this matter in detail in <a href="http://www.cityethics.org/node/720&quot; target="”_blank">an earlier blog post</a>,
where I showed the limitations of a Massachusetts ethics provision,
which applies to local officials. The San Francisco provision would
better deal with this problem.<br>
<br>
The other situation involves an allegation, made publicly, that a board
chair offered a board member his chairmanship in return for using the
board member's influence as a party committee chair to get another
board member a town job. Since the chairmanship has no financial value,
this would not normally be considered a conflict on the chairman's
part. And the misuse of a political position, as opposed to an
elected board position, is also not generally considered an ethical violation. And yet no one would consider the
offer, or acceptance of the offer, to be ethical.<br>
<br>
Again, this problem could be solved by defining "interest" and
"benefit" as including the non-financial along with the financial. But
even with such a definition, it could be helpful to have a provision
that deals expressly with this issue, as in San Francisco and
Massachusetts.<br>
<br>
Robert Wechsler<br>
Director of Research-Retired, City Ethics<br>
<br>
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