Spring Reading: Alan Rosenthal on Lobbying II

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Thu, 05/15/2014 - 11:59

Lobbyists

This is the second post on Alan Rosenthal's <a href="http://books.google.com/books?id=pcOyJfxNwfwC" target="”_blank”">The Third
House: Lobbyists and Lobbying in the States</a> (CQ Press,
1993). This post focuses on the importance of connections over influence, the
role of money and constituents in local lobbying, and local
lobbyists as relatively unprofessional, and what that means for lobbying regulation. 
 
Professionalization 
Because there are fewer professional lobbyists at the local level,
the contract lobbyists who are successful locally sometimes become
power brokers. These individuals can best represent their clients by
being in a position to pull a lot of strings. They can get into this
position through their involvement in the majority political party,
through the services they provide to officials, through their
involvement in and financial support (directly and through clients)
of political campaigns, and through the personal relationships they
form. 
 
Rosenthal notes that the professionalization of lobbying has made
full-time lobbyists more open to regulation, because they want to be
seen as professional. They also know that it is better for them to have clear lines
drawn so that they don't find themselves embroiled in scandals.
In addition, limitations on giving save them money. 
 
Local lobbyists are less likely to
be full-time or have a professional identity. Therefore, they are
less likely to support lobbying regulations than their state and
federal equivalents. This is clearly one reason why there are so few
local lobbying codes, and why those that exist do not appear to have
been very professionally drafted (that is, their drafters do not
seem to have looked at the better local lobbying codes).

Influence, Access, and Connections 
Rosenthal notes that friendship is more important in lobbying than
people realize. The press focuses on money and entertaining, but as
Rosenthal says, "legislators, like the rest of us, are more apt to
do things for individuals they like and trust. ... Legislators and
lobbyists naturally gravitate toward one another. Because they share
a stake in the legislative system, they can commiserate and
celebrate with each other." Rosenthal recognizes that it's no one
thing that makes a difference, but rather "a whole string of
contacts that forges the link." 
 
The press tends to focus on influence as the lobbyist's primary
goal, but Rosenthal recognizes that the primary goal is access. But
he considers "access" too vague a word. He prefers the term
"connection," because it is personal relationships that enable
lobbyists to get preferential treatment for the benefits their
clients are seeking. Anyone get access, but it is these connections
that provide access at critical times and in especially important
ways, such as being involved in negotiations, getting amendments
passed or killed, and convincing leadership to let a matter die. It
is also relationships that make lobbyists privy to non-public
information, or public information before it becomes public, which
can make all the difference in the success of their clients' goals. 
 
You can have all the access in the world, but more important is that
warning call from a council member that lets you know you have to
show up at a council committee meeting, or else. Connections also
mean that friendly council members will introduce and recommend you
to their colleagues with whom you do not yet have a connection. 
 
This is especially true when lobbyists are former legislators,
because the "bonding that takes place in the legislature has no
substitute: the experiences shared, the favors exchanged, and the
debts incurred are without parallel." This is as true locally as at
the state level. 
 
As Rosenthal says, "To have a good relationship with legislators
confers power on a lobbyist. For one to be close to power is
tantamount to possessing it." 
 
What Money Buys 
Lobbying is not a quid pro quo endeavor. It is about ongoing
relationships. Following the money is not enough. Nor does it matter
much if money is given to influence officials or to satisfy their
pay-to-play requirements. Money is just one part of building and
maintaining relationships that, over time, provide a great variety of
benefits. This is why it is so important
to require lobbyists to disclose all contacts and to limit the range of
activities that skew local government officials away from the
benefiting their community toward benefiting those with whom they
have formed special relationships. Recognizing this is necessary to
recognizing lobbying regulation as a central element of a local
government ethics program. 
 
Rosenthal cites a study that looked at the effect of money not on
votes (where money appears not to matter very much), but rather on committee participation. It found that "money
mainly bought the marginal time, energy, and legislative resources
that committee participation required." Not votes, but
participation. After all, without participation by sympathetic
legislators, matters cannot get out of committee. 
 
Rosenthal gives two examples of nonprofits successful in getting
grants, one due to a great deal of lobbying, the other due to a
conflict of interest. Over four years, the Greater Miami Opera spent
$200,000 on lobbyists and received $2 million in state grants. This
is a large return on investment. A new museum called the Discovery
Center did not spend a penny on lobbying and yet got a $427,000
grant, most likely because the state House speaker was a board
member. The moral of the story is that there's no better lobbyist to
have on staff than a high-level official (which is why high-level
officials should not sit on boards of organizations seeking special
benefits from their government). 
 
Constituents 
The focus on inside lobbying — lobbying directly to officials —
ignores the most important connection an elected official has:
with constituents. That is why outside lobbying is such an important
complement to inside lobbying. It shows officials that their
constituents are concerned with an issue, in the form of
communications, petitions, demonstrations, op-ed pieces and letters
to the editor, etc. 
 
Numbers of constituents aren't all that matters. Rosenthal talks
about "key contacts," that is, constituents who have not only
special interests in a matter (an association member or a company
employee), but also a special relationship with a particular
official (family member, customer, neighbor, former colleague, or
professional (e.g., the official's doctor or personal trainer)). One
personally known constituent is worth a hundred strangers. 
 
Rosenthal gives an example of an issue where outside lobbying is
impossible, despite the fact that every association member is
politically active. The issue is blocking a state ethics code for
local officials. The problem is that local officials cannot be seen
publicly to be opposing such a code. So they are forced to work
behind the scenes. This is why, in a time of scandal, when state
legislators feel forced to do something, there is no public
opposition to ethics reform (or the public opposition is so absurd
that it is mocked by newspaper editorials and good government
organizations). 
 
The Dilemma of Perception 
One of the most entertaining parts of this book is the dilemma that
Rosenthal discusses in the final chapter, "Power and
Representation." Noting that "in the world of lobbying, perception
is reality," Rosenthal says that the press tends to portray
lobbyists as having too much influence and wielding too much power.
Everyone likes to read about a lobbyist who's calling the shots
behind the scenes. Lobbyists know they rarely get to call the shots.
However, since that's what they're paid to do, they can't very well
object to being portrayed as more successful than they really are.
They're stuck with the perception they want their clients to
believe, even if it happens to be a perception that turns the public
against them. A team coach might be able to pooh-pooh the press
giving him credit for winning a championship, but a lobbyist can't
give all the credit to the council. 
 
The Wisdom of Lobbyists 
Here are a few good quotes to close with: 
 
From a New Jersey association lobbyist: "You can't name a lobbyist
who has won with money. All I want money to do is keep me even." 
 
From a Florida lobbyist, where the legislature was in session for
two months: "We're geishas for two months." 
 
From a lobbyist: "You should never kill a bill so bad that [the
opposition] can't come back next year, or you'll be out of
business." 
 
From a Minnesota association lobbyist: "It's harder to vote against
someone you know than someone you don't know." 
 
From Rosenthal: "a campaign contribution from those who are
expected to give is regarded simply as table stakes, ... an ante for
getting dealt a hand in the game." 
 
A Florida contract lobbyist: "Everything must be seen in terms of
relationships." 
 
Robert Wechsler 
Director of Research-Retired, City Ethics 
 
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Spring Reading: Alan Rosenthal on Lobbying II

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