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Moral Clarity II - Intentions
Tuesday, April 6th, 2010
Robert Wechsler
This is the second in a series of blog posts inspired by reading Susan
Neiman’s book Moral
Clarity:
A
Guide for Grown-Up Idealists (Princeton, 2008).
A controversial aspect of government ethics involves intentions or motivations. Must an official be shown to have intended to act unethically in order to be penalized by an ethics commission? Most officials believe, or talk as if they believe, that intent must be shown. Otherwise, they say, they are guilty of a mere oversight or technical error, and this often enrages them. They consider enforcement against such oversights unjust.
The philosopher Immanuel Kant took a very strong position on intentions. He believed that we never know what our true motives are, because we are highly skilled at self-deception. We like to think that we are acting out of good motives. But if we can’t know our own motives — what we intended — how can anyone else?
Since Kant felt that we need to follow essential principles and act out of duty, it doesn’t matter why we act as we do. In addition, although intent may be important to determining penalties for murder, in government ethics intent doesn’t matter any more than it does when an official makes an error relating to a bridge or a pension fund.
Focusing on intentions can be very harmful. If we believe our intentions are good, we will not scrutinize our actions, but believe that they are good, as well. This leads to self-righteousness, and a lot of bad conduct.
Focusing on intentions also leads us to discount others’ good deeds. We wonder if the person acted to further her career or enjoy the admiration he is given for acting well. “If evil actions don’t require evil motives, good actions don’t require good ones,” Neiman writes.
Far too often, I too make the mistake of taking into account a government official’s intentions. It’s natural to do this, because we are always seeking a reason behind what occurs in the world. But in government ethics, seeking the reason behind officials’ conduct is at best secondary, and at worst harmful.
Other blog posts in this series:
Reason and Ideals
Ethics Environments
Robert Wechsler
Director of Research-Retired, City Ethics
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A controversial aspect of government ethics involves intentions or motivations. Must an official be shown to have intended to act unethically in order to be penalized by an ethics commission? Most officials believe, or talk as if they believe, that intent must be shown. Otherwise, they say, they are guilty of a mere oversight or technical error, and this often enrages them. They consider enforcement against such oversights unjust.
The philosopher Immanuel Kant took a very strong position on intentions. He believed that we never know what our true motives are, because we are highly skilled at self-deception. We like to think that we are acting out of good motives. But if we can’t know our own motives — what we intended — how can anyone else?
Since Kant felt that we need to follow essential principles and act out of duty, it doesn’t matter why we act as we do. In addition, although intent may be important to determining penalties for murder, in government ethics intent doesn’t matter any more than it does when an official makes an error relating to a bridge or a pension fund.
Focusing on intentions can be very harmful. If we believe our intentions are good, we will not scrutinize our actions, but believe that they are good, as well. This leads to self-righteousness, and a lot of bad conduct.
Focusing on intentions also leads us to discount others’ good deeds. We wonder if the person acted to further her career or enjoy the admiration he is given for acting well. “If evil actions don’t require evil motives, good actions don’t require good ones,” Neiman writes.
Far too often, I too make the mistake of taking into account a government official’s intentions. It’s natural to do this, because we are always seeking a reason behind what occurs in the world. But in government ethics, seeking the reason behind officials’ conduct is at best secondary, and at worst harmful.
Other blog posts in this series:
Reason and Ideals
Ethics Environments
Robert Wechsler
Director of Research-Retired, City Ethics
---
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