The Administrative-Criminal Enforcement Fiefdom in Ferguson, MO

The word "fiefdom" does not appear in the U.S. Justice Department's March 4 report on Ferguson, MO's police department, but that is what the report describes. What is unusual about the fiefdom is that it is controlled by the council, not by an executive or attorney. It is far from a classic fiefdom, which is why Ferguson has once again attracted my attention. One thing that is especially disturbing is that many of the same attributes appear in other cities and towns in the area (see the report's final recommendation). This is a form of institutional corruption that appears to have become the, or at least a, norm in St. Louis County. It should come as no surprise that St. Louis is in the minority of large cities without a government conflicts of interest program, and that the state's municipal ethics program is weak.

With a council-manager form of government, Ferguson's council appoints the city manager, who is the city's CEO. But the city manager is also the chief of police. The council also appoints municipal judges, which is unusual. In fact, the municipal court is supervised by the police chief, is "considered part of the police department for City organizational purposes, and is physically located within the police station." The city attorney is also the prosecutor. In short, there is no separation of powers and no independent body or oversight in the city. This is the sign of a very successful fiefdom, in this case one that is focused on criminal enforcement.

The municipal code has vague rules that allow for the arrest of just about anyone (the most bizarre is Manner of Walking in Roadway), and beyond this there are unwritten rules (such as the ability to list someone as "wanted" so that no warrant is necessary to make an arrest) and strong pressures to raise money through multiple citations for a single incident.

In addition, a lot of discretion is left to police officers and the courts. "The Ferguson municipal code sets forth a limited number of protocols that the court must follow, but the code leaves most aspects of court operations to the discretion of the court itself." In a fiefdom, discretion is made available so that it may be abused, both negatively and, in such things as ticket fixing, positively. Either way, the result is preferential treatment. Discretion is the alternative to clear rules that allow people to know what is expected and what their rights are.

Ferguson's fiefdom is, like all fiefdoms, characterized by a lack of transparency, both intentionally and through the unprofessional record-keeping that accompanies a lack of clear standards.

Finally, the efforts of the police and the court are focused on generating revenue. Law enforcement should never be tied to revenue, and no revenue pressures should be placed on police officers or court officials (the city's finance director was involved in “efforts to increase efficiencies and maximize collection” by the court). When the goal of public safety is overshadowed by the goal of revenue generation, and pressures to act unethically are brought to bear, this is a sure sign of a fiefdom, in this case a white fiefdom in a black city, which makes it that much uglier.

But since the report does not recognize the fiefdom problem, its recommendations relate to a change in policing rather than a change in the city's power structure. It deals with symptoms rather than the cause. Implementing the recommendations would improve the city's criminal justice system, but not the city's ethics environment.

The city should have council members that represent districts; it should separate the city manager from the police department, with citizen oversight over the police department; it should separate the office of the city attorney from the office of the prosecutor; the municipal code should be changed so that there are no ambiguous criminal rules and much less discretion available; and the current unwritten rules should be the subject of an independent investigation. The rules should be written down and discussed, recommendations should be made to the council, and the council should reject all or most of them, and place into law those it feels are in the best interests of the community, as well as rules to prevent the unwritten rules from being followed.

For more on fiefdoms, see the section of my book Local Government Ethics Programs on this topic.

Robert Wechsler
Director of Research-Retired, City Ethics

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