Maryland Prosecutor Concedes Council Members' Legislative Immunity in Non-Criminal Ethics Proceedings
Once again, it has been proven that placing ethics in the hands of prosecutors can be damaging
to the cause of government ethics. The proof this time is in the state prosecutor's
opposition to the Baltimore mayor's motion to dismiss criminal ethics
charges against her, partially on account of legislative immunity.<br>
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In his <a href="http://www.baltocts.state.md.us/highlighted_trials/Opposition_to_Dixon_…; target="”_blank”">opposition
to the motion to dismiss</a>, the state prosecutor argues (pp. 25-29)
that common-law legislative immunity, which he gets confused with official
immunity, applies only to civil, not to criminal cases. Isn't it nice
of the prosecutor to concede an application of immunity law that has
absolutely no relevance to his case, but does affect non-criminal
ethics enforcement? Especially when, due to institutional waiver by the
Baltimore council, what he conceded would not even be true with respect to Baltimore's ethics code?<br>
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For more on this case, click <a href="http://www.cityethics.org/node/707" target="”_blank”">here</a>.<br>
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