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Mayors and Post-Employment Restrictions
Monday, August 13th, 2012
Robert Wechsler
When it comes to post-employment restrictions, a mayor should not be
considered as just a member of the legislative or executive branch, no
matter what the form of government (strong mayor or mayor-council).
A mayor has a special status that sets her apart from other local
officials. Post-employment restrictions that apply only to one's
branch or agency should not be relevant to a mayor. During the
cooling-off period, a mayor should not do business with or lobby the
government at all.
The situation that led me to write about this actually involved a governor, but the idea is the same. Indiana's governor was named president of a major state university, and he responsibly asked for post-employment advice relevant to this situation. According to an AP article this weekend, the state inspector general and the Department of Administration's executive director of executive branch lobbying both said that no restrictions apply to the governor in his job as university president. The IG said that a state officer leaving the executive branch is not restricted from lobbying the legislature. And the executive branch lobbying director said that university officials are not considered executive branch lobbyists.
Both these decisions ignore the purposes behind post-employment restrictions. A very recent governor lobbying the executive or legislative branches gives his employer a great advantage. It's not just that he has contacts. He helped make the careers of many of these people. They have personal obligations to him, based on special relationships, that have nothing to do with the public interest.
Yes, a university president is not what most people think of a lobbyist. But that's not because he isn't a lobbyist. It's because he's an exceptionally powerful and prominent lobbyist with just one client, one big client that gets a great deal of money from the state and has many interests in legislation and in many sorts of decision as an employer, landowner, developer, researcher, etc. There is little doubt that the governor was selected not only for his management skills, but also for his ability to pull in the bucks and get favorable decisions from the state government.
At the local level, the problems are even greater. A university president is extremely powerful in a city or county, and the separation between executive and legislative branches is usually less than at the state level.
An Appointee's Ethics Opinion
One aspect of the Indiana situation shows how damaging this sort of situation can be at the local level. The governor asked the IG for an ethics opinion (the EC does have to approve the IG's opinion to make it count, but approval is the norm). Thus, in Indiana the IG is equivalent to an ethics officer or EC executive director.
In Indiana, the governor appoints the IG. Therefore, the appearance is of a governor's appointee telling the governor he can do what is best for him personally. In most cities and counties, the ethics officer, city or county attorney, or EC members are appointed by the mayor. When the mayor asks for an opinion, and is given the one she wants, it looks like she was given special consideration by, of all people, those responsible for the local ethics program. This undermines faith both in the government and in the ethics program. This cannot be allowed to happen.
Finally, there is the issue of whether a sitting or very recent governor or mayor should be offered a position from an organization that has been seeking, and will continue to seek, benefits from the state or local government. This creates the appearance that the organization might have been given special consideration in return for the job.
Robert Wechsler
Director of Research-Retired, City Ethics
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The situation that led me to write about this actually involved a governor, but the idea is the same. Indiana's governor was named president of a major state university, and he responsibly asked for post-employment advice relevant to this situation. According to an AP article this weekend, the state inspector general and the Department of Administration's executive director of executive branch lobbying both said that no restrictions apply to the governor in his job as university president. The IG said that a state officer leaving the executive branch is not restricted from lobbying the legislature. And the executive branch lobbying director said that university officials are not considered executive branch lobbyists.
Both these decisions ignore the purposes behind post-employment restrictions. A very recent governor lobbying the executive or legislative branches gives his employer a great advantage. It's not just that he has contacts. He helped make the careers of many of these people. They have personal obligations to him, based on special relationships, that have nothing to do with the public interest.
Yes, a university president is not what most people think of a lobbyist. But that's not because he isn't a lobbyist. It's because he's an exceptionally powerful and prominent lobbyist with just one client, one big client that gets a great deal of money from the state and has many interests in legislation and in many sorts of decision as an employer, landowner, developer, researcher, etc. There is little doubt that the governor was selected not only for his management skills, but also for his ability to pull in the bucks and get favorable decisions from the state government.
At the local level, the problems are even greater. A university president is extremely powerful in a city or county, and the separation between executive and legislative branches is usually less than at the state level.
An Appointee's Ethics Opinion
One aspect of the Indiana situation shows how damaging this sort of situation can be at the local level. The governor asked the IG for an ethics opinion (the EC does have to approve the IG's opinion to make it count, but approval is the norm). Thus, in Indiana the IG is equivalent to an ethics officer or EC executive director.
In Indiana, the governor appoints the IG. Therefore, the appearance is of a governor's appointee telling the governor he can do what is best for him personally. In most cities and counties, the ethics officer, city or county attorney, or EC members are appointed by the mayor. When the mayor asks for an opinion, and is given the one she wants, it looks like she was given special consideration by, of all people, those responsible for the local ethics program. This undermines faith both in the government and in the ethics program. This cannot be allowed to happen.
Finally, there is the issue of whether a sitting or very recent governor or mayor should be offered a position from an organization that has been seeking, and will continue to seek, benefits from the state or local government. This creates the appearance that the organization might have been given special consideration in return for the job.
Robert Wechsler
Director of Research-Retired, City Ethics
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