Do Chinese walls (that is, mechanisms that separate someone from information or involvement in a matter) work in conflict situations in government? And what considerations determine whether they work or not?

One consideration is whether, even with the Chinese wall, there is still an appearance of a conflict. Another consideration is whether the individual will still have access to the information or still be involved in the matter despite the Chinese wall; that is, whether the Chinese wall is really a Chinese screen.

There are two important Chinese walls in the news the last couple of days. One involves congressional representatives in the position of choosing defense-related earmarks and their access to information about which recipients of those earmarks made campaign contributions to them, at what amounts and at what times. The other involves what was apparently a sweetheart deal between Florida and the United States Sugar Company, where the governor's chief of staff's law firm represented U.S. Sugar in the negotiations.

Last December, I listed the major recommendations of Philadelphia's Task Force on Ethics and Campaign Finance Reform in its 58-page report.

According to an article in yesterday's Philadelphia Inquirer, just three months later, fifteen of seventeen city council members have co-sponsored a series of ethics reform bills. That sounds like good, fast work that deserves some serious applause.

But there are some big question marks. One is that none of the bills are available online. Each bill is given a bill-less page (1  2  3  4   5; also see the March 4 council minutes for a full list of the bills and sponsors), and in one case there is even a link to a bill, but the link doesn't work. So I am dependent, for now, on what I read in the newspaper.

Influence. It's a big word in a lot of government ethics laws, and a word that those who write such laws should think at least twice about.

As everyone knows, New York Governor David Paterson has been accused by the NY Commission on Public Integrity (CPI) of having violated the state's gift ban by asking for and receiving five tickets to the first game of last year's World Series, at Yankee Stadium. But the reports are, of course, ignoring the language of the law. Here it is:

I recently noted Oakland, CA's odd nepotism ordinance. Well, its Public Ethics Commission is also odd, and worthy of a look. I was alerted to some of its oddities by a recent A Better Oakland blog post entitled "Does Oakland Need a Public Ethics Commission?" An odd question from someone who does not have an ax to grind against campaign finance laws.

Many ethics commissions handle campaign finance and lobbying matters as well as conflict of interest or ethics matters, but Oakland's handles almost exclusively the former, despite its name. It does have jurisdiction over the city's conflict of interest code (Ch. 3-16 of the Code of Ordinances), but this "code" is nothing but an incorporation by reference of a state law that requires financial disclosure and has only two provisions, a basic conflict of interest provision and a provision on loans to officials. Neither the city code nor the EC website provides a link to this state law.

Your big brother is a powerful member of city council, and you're just a deputy city clerk. There's got to be more than this! So you retire, take your pension of $68,000, and run for state representative, with all the support your brother and his friends can provide, adding another $86,000 in salary and the prospect of a second government pension. Not bad.

But not enough. You set up a lobbying firm, "to help businesses engage" with the city, and you let your partner engage with the state, since you can't do that yourself. For an office from which to lobby city officials, including your brother, you find a bargain: in your brother's building, where you and he already have your constituent offices.

I don't usually use examples from Congress, but this one is too good, and instructive. According to yesterday's New York Times, Billy Tauzin, when he was a Louisiana congressional representative, started two hunting clubs, whose memberships included primarily lobbyists and executives of companies with business before the committee he chaired, the energy and commerce committee.