The Revolving Door: Descent or Ascent?
The U.S. is not the only country with a revolving-door problem. In
Japan, the problem is deeply institutionalized. It is as much a part of
the retirement system as pensions.<br>
<br>
But the Japanese name for the revolving door shows that not only does
the system work in a different
manner than ours, but that the Japanese have a different opinion of the
relative value of government and business. The name is <i>amakudari</i>, which means "descent
from heaven," the way Shinto gods used to come down to visit earth.
Government is heaven, business earth. But not just anyone in
government is considered a god (metaphorically speaking), only
top-level bureaucrats.<br>
<br>
According to <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amakudari" target="”_blank”">the
Wikipedia page on <i>amakudari</i></a>,
it
isn't quite as simple as the name implies. There are separate names
for various forms of <i>amakudari. </i>A
move
to a government corporation is known as <i>yokosuberi, </i>or "sideslip";
successive public and private sector
appointments are known as <i>wataridori,
</i>or "migratory bird"; and a move into elected office is known as <i>seikai tensin</i> (I can't find a
translation of this term).<br>
<br>
There are two things that characterize the Japanese revolving door. One
is that it opens up high positions for younger bureaucrats, which is
rarely a factor in the American revolving door. Second, as the name
implies, it is generally considered a step down, even if the work is
less and the pay better. In the U.S., on the other hand, it is often
considered a step up, a reward for loyalty or for pushing certain
interests.<br>
<br>
The revolving door is not as institutionalized here as it is in Japan,
but in many local governments it is more institutionalized than people
realize. Unlike in Japan, one's own agency does not arrange for the
post-employment position (this is changing even there). But the promise
or expectation of a good post-employment position can be as big a draw
as a good pension (and often both are available).<br>
<br>
Take one town I know a lot about, for example. Two first selectmen
(effectively the mayor) in a row ended up in good positions after their
retirement, one as head of the local chamber of commerce, the other in
a state agency. This elected position also earns its holders a pension
after only eight years.<br>
<br>
Are such expectations (in addition to a $100,000 salary) necessary to
attract good administrators? Considering that the next two first
selectmen, one from the other party, ran for the position without any
interest in post-employment jobs, I would say, No.<br>
<br>
But such expectations may be necessary to attract people who will not
rock the boat, who will not make an issue of unbid contracts, budget
manipulation, the appointment of unqualified insiders, and the like.<br>
<br>
This is a side of the revolving door that is often ignored. It's not as
often an issue for elected officials, but it can be a way to ensure
that department heads and the like remain team players, not only in
office, but after they leave office, especially if they work for a
company or organization that does business with or, like the chamber of
commerce, has an interest in the policies of the local government.<br>
<br>
<i>Amakudari</i> has been a big
reason why Japan has been so slow at dealing
with its big problems, such as its banking system. And in U.S. local
governments, the future expectations of current officials, and the
relationships between business and government formed by the revolving
door, can also be a
reason why local governments do not deal with their problems,
especially their government ethics problems.<br>
<br>
Robert Wechsler<br>
Director of Research-Retired, City Ethics<br>
<br>
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